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CONFRONTING INDETERMINACY AND
BIAS IN CHILD PROTECTION LAW
Josh Gupta-Kagan*
The child protection legal system faces strong and growing demands for
change following at least two critiques. First, child protection law is substantively
indeterminate; it does not precisely prescribe when state agencies can intervene in
family life and what that intervention should entail, thus granting wide discretion
to child protection agencies and family courts. Second, by granting such discretion,
the law permits race, class, sex, and other forms of bias to infect decisions and
regulate low-income families and families of color.
This Article extends these critiques through a granular analysis of how
indeterminacy at multiple decision points builds on itself. The law does not tether
permissible interventions to specific types of maltreatment. Minor cases can lead
to family separations and even terminations of parent-child relationships. Steps
required for reunification can become unrelated to grounds for state intervention.
States expend many resources to separate families after failing to spend similar
amounts to preserve families.
A child protection reform legislative agenda has begun to emerge, but without
comprehensively addressing the indeterminacy at the heart of the present legal
structure. This Article argues a transformed system must include determinate
substantive standards for various stages of child protection cases to limit the
system’s scope and the potential for biased decisionmaking. The law should define
neglect and abuse with precision, both to limit unnecessary state intervention and
set maximum levels of state intervention based on the specific maltreatment at
issue. The law should require states to spend as much money on helping families
stay together as they would on maintaining children in foster care. State action to
terminate the legal relationship between parents and children should be limited to
situations in which any form of parent-child relationship is harmful to the child.
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. The author would like
to thank Jane Spinak and Nancy Polikoff for organizing the “Strengthened Bonds: Abolishing
the Child Welfare System and Re-Envisioning Child Well-Being” symposium in June 2021,
and all the contributors and speakers at the symposium, for inspiring and informing the ideas
in this Article. The author thanks Avni Gupta-Kagan, Clare Huntington, Laura MatthewsJolly, Jyoti Nanda, Eve Rips, and Michael Wald for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and
Gabby Williams for excellent research assistance. Special thanks are due to Judge Leonard
Edwards, David Kelly, Solangel Maldonado, Vivek Sankaran, and Kristen Weber for their
thoughtful commentary on this Article, to Michael Wald for catalyzing those commentaries,
and to James Stone and the entire staff at the Stanford Law & Policy Review for organizing
those commentaries and the related panel discussion, and for their thoughtful edits throughout
the production process. All errors are the author’s.
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INTRODUCTION
The child protection legal system is at an inflection point. A growing family
defense movement fights against state efforts to separate parents from their
children. Calls to abolish foster care, analogous to calls to abolish prisons and
police, have grown among advocates1 and academics.2 Government officials
from multiple administrations have cited the need for a dramatic change to, and
racial justice in, child protection practice.3 Federal funding rules now emphasize
preventing family separations rather than funding foster care after such
separations occur.4 The very name of the system is subject to renewed debate,
with advocates urging use of the “family regulation” or “family policing” system
in place of “child welfare.”5 And calls for reforming the legal (and mostly

1. See, e.g., upEND: All Children Deserve to Be with Their Families, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y, https://perma.cc/NTT4-9ZPV (archived Apr. 23, 2022) (“Thus, the
work of the upEND Movement isn’t about reform, it is about ending the current child welfare
system; it is about the abolition of child welfare through the creation of new, anti-racist
structures and practices to keep children safe and protected in their homes.”); Keyna Franklin,
‘We Want Policing Defunded in All Forms—Including the Family Policing System’, RISE
(June 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/CTK9-TMXZ (describing abolition activism in New York
City).
2. For instance, Professors Nancy Polikoff and Jane Spinak, together with the Columbia
Journal of Race and Law, organized a 2021 symposium entitled “Strengthened Bonds:
Abolishing the Child Welfare System and Re-Envisioning Child Well-Being.” The Columbia
Journal of Race and Law Announces Its Volume 11 Symposium, COLUM. J. RACE & L. (Feb. 4,
2021), https://perma.cc/WS5L-VFUD; see also Alan J. Dettlaff, Kristen Weber, Maya
Pendleton, Reiko Boyd, Bill Bettencourt & Leonard Burton, It Is Not a Broken System, It Is a
System that Needs to Be Broken: The upEND Movement to Abolish the Child Welfare System,
14 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 500, 508-10 (2020); Lisa Kelly, Abolition or Reform: Confronting
the Symbiotic Relationship Between “Child Welfare” and the Carceral State, 17 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 255, 300-19 (2021).
3. See Jerry Milner & David Kelly, It’s Time to Stop Confusing Poverty with Neglect,
CHILD.’S BUREAU EXPRESS (Dec. 2019/Jan. 2020), https://perma.cc/MF34-LMN9 (criticizing
“small, incremental improvements and minor tweaks” and how child protection professionals
“see and judge families that make contact with the system . . . as the ‘other’”); A Message
From Associate Commissioner Aysha Schomburg, CHILD.’S BUREAU EXPRESS (May 2021),
https://perma.cc/UX3K-P82T (asserting “that racism and bias have roots deep in the child
welfare system”). Milner was Association Commissioner of the Children’s Bureau under
President Trump and Schomburg serves in that role under President Biden.
4. See infra Part III.B.
5. Dorothy Roberts conceptualized how child protection agencies regulate families. See
generally Dorothy Roberts, Feminism, Race, and Adoption Policy, in ADOPTION MATTERS:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND FEMINIST ESSAYS 234 (Sally Haslanger & Charlotte Witt eds., 2005).
Recent scholarship from Emma Peyton Williams used the phrase “family regulation system”
to describe the legal system involving those agencies and family courts. Emma Peyton
Williams, Dreaming of Abolitionist Futures, Reconceptualizing Child Welfare: Keeping Kids
Safe in the Age of Abolition 14-16 (Apr. 27, 2020) (B.A. thesis, Oberlin College) (on file with
the Oberlin College Libraries). The phrase “family regulation system” accurately describes
the legal system at issue and I have used it elsewhere. Brianna Harvey, Josh Gupta-Kagan &
Christopher Church, Reimagining Schools’ Role Outside the Family Regulation System, 11
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 575, 578 n.1 (2021). In this Article, however, I refer to the “child
protection system” to emphasize what should be the legal system’s focus and the Article’s
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statutory) structure governing state child protective intervention in families have
grown, with discrete successes in several state legislatures.6
These demands for change follow at least two long-standing critiques of
child protection cases which reach family court and separate families.7 First,
child protection law is substantively indeterminate; instead of precisely
prescribing when state child protective services (CPS) agencies can intervene in
family life and what that intervention should entail, the law grants agencies and
family courts wide discretion to regulate and separate families. Second, that wide
discretion permits biases (implicit or explicit) to inform decisionmaking, and the
present child protection system has long been criticized for perpetuating racial,
class, and other forms of injustice. Dorothy Roberts famously described the
present system this way: “If you came with no preconceptions about the purpose
of the child welfare system, you would have to conclude that it is an institution
designed to monitor, regulate, and punish poor Black families.”8 That is, the
indeterminacy at the heart of child protection law is a tool that empowers state
authorities to exercise control of low-income and minority families.
This Article extends these critiques through a granular analysis of child
protection cases. This analysis demonstrates how the law’s indeterminacy builds
through the life of a case and is not limited to the definitions of neglect and
removal standards that were the focus of past indeterminacy critiques. In
particular, little or no legal tie exists between different types of maltreatment and
different interventions. In most states, any kind of neglect or abuse leads to
placement of the parent on a child abuse or neglect registry—regardless of any
nexus between the maltreatment and future risk to child if that parent works in
child care. Any kind of neglect or abuse can lead to any disposition; unlike
criminal law (and, increasingly, juvenile delinquency law), there is no legal tie
between the type of misconduct and the punishment. Any adjudicated child
maltreatment leads to an evolving case planning process in which the steps a
parent must take to reunify need not be tethered to the maltreatment which courts
adjudicated. Legal obligations on the state to work to keep families together are
so vague in substance and weak in practice that states can and do spend tens of

goal of helping the legal system protect children from severe harm from neglect and abuse
without intervening in families more than necessary to achieve that goal.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. Other critiques of the broader child protection system highlight cases which lead to
investigation and surveillance, but not separation, of families. E.g., Marsha Garrison,
Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 590,
595-99 (2005); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to
Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 418-22 (2005); Clare
Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 1489-97
(2007); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child Welfare, 92
NEB. L. REV. 897, 903-28 (2014). These critiques focus on the broader system’s reactive and
often ineffective response to alleged child maltreatment, which includes but is not limited to
the legal regulation of agency and family court decisions in cases involving family separations.
This Article instead focuses on that legal regulation.
8. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 6 (2002).
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thousands of dollars taking care of children they have removed from parental
custody after failing to spend similar sums keeping families together.9
When children have extended foster care placements under indeterminate
legal standards, the law uses some limited determinate standards to push cases
toward permanent family destruction. In particular, the law includes a
presumption of seeking termination of parents’ and children’s legal relationships
when children have remained in foster care for fifteen months, and a preference
for adoptions (which generally require terminations) over guardianships (a new
family arrangement that does not require terminations).10 These determinate
standards have often lacked empirical support and serve to increase state
intervention into constitutionally-protected family life.11
A legislative agenda to transform the child protection system has begun to
emerge, but only piecemeal and without comprehensively addressing the
indeterminacy in the present legal structure. Various discrete reforms have been
enacted in a small number of states, such as slightly narrowed definitions of
neglect, and somewhat strengthened procedural protections for parents who
challenge their placement by CPS agencies on child neglect and abuse
registries.12 Congress has revised federal law to encourage state CPS agencies to
invest in “prevention” activities.13 The Stronger CAPTA (Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act), passed by the U.S. House in March 2021 and
pending in the Senate, nods in the direction of the two critiques, providing
funding to study the causes and solutions for racial inequality in the child
protection legal system, “including how neglect is defined.”14 In perhaps the
most important development, family defense offices have strengthened and the
federal government has invested more money in such offices, which emerging
research suggests leads to improved outcomes for the entire system.15 However,
comprehensive legislative reform to confront the indeterminacy that reigns in
child protection cases and the bias it permits has not yet crystalized.
This Article seeks to expand the agenda for a transformed system to include
determinate substantive standards that tether the type of intervention to the type
of maltreatment and thus mitigate the potential for inconsistent and biased
decisionmaking by agencies and courts. An expanded agenda begins with a goal

9. See infra notes 239-244 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Parts III.A.5.d-e.
11. Parental rights to “the care, custody, and control of their children [] [are] perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Accordingly, parents are entitled to a court hearing focused on their
fitness before the state may remove their child from their custody. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 649 (1972). The Constitution protects family integrity even when parents “have not been
model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State” through its foster
system. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. Stronger Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, H.R. 485, 117th Cong. § 104
(2021).
15. See infra Part III.C.
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of limiting state intervention in families to severe cases of child maltreatment,
which the law should define more precisely. Family separations should only
follow intensive efforts to keep families safely together, a standard the law
should define more meaningfully than at present. When CPS agencies do
intervene, the specific form of maltreatment found should limit the nature and
duration of the intervention which may follow, and the law should not permit an
evolving set of concerns to keep families separated indefinitely. State action to
terminate the legal relationship between parents and children should be limited
to situations in which any form of parent-child relationship is harmful to the
child, not, as in current law, used when arbitrary time limits are reached or to
facilitate the adoption of foster children by new parents when other family
arrangements are possible.
Some of these recommendations are ambitious enough that they can only be
outlined here—such as precisely delineating different forms of neglect and abuse
and tying those forms to different dispositions with a specificity on par with the
criminal code. Other proposals are easy enough to explain, but bold in their
implications for the legal system—such as the principle that states should expend
at least as much money on helping families stay together and reunifying them as
they would on maintaining children in foster care, thus ending the disturbing
disparities in which states pay foster parents generous monthly stipends after
refusing to do the equivalent for parents struggling to take care of their children.
There are several things these proposals do not do. First, they do not
eliminate the present child protection legal system. Rather, they seek to focus
that system and its most severe interventions on the most harmful forms of
maltreatment that system is designed to address. Second, they do not design the
alternative structures that would be necessary to provide voluntary and
supportive assistance to families outside of the child protection system; that
essential work has begun in other forums and must continue.16 This Article
focuses instead on steps needed to narrow the existing system, and, when CPS
agencies bring families to court, better regulate agency and family court
discretion.
Part I of this Article examines one recent case which illustrates the problems
of the legal status quo. The indeterminacy of child protection law allowed a case
that began with a low-income mother’s inadequate child care to separate a family
for an evolving host of reasons that bore little connection to the initial grounds
for intervention, and with the state spending more money to keep the family
separate than to help the mother with child care arrangements. Timeline
pressures ultimately led to the permanent and unnecessary destruction of a
family. Part II describes and critiques the indeterminacy at the heart of child
protection law and the harms it causes. Part III explores current proposals for
changes to this system, and how a comprehensive agenda for addressing
indeterminacy remains lacking. Part IV outlines proposals for a more
determinate system that limits the situations when CPS agencies and family
courts may intervene in families and what that intervention may entail.
16. See sources cited infra note 344.
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I. ILLUSTRATING INDETERMINACY AND LIKELY BIAS IN CHILD PROTECTION
CASES: IN RE A.M.
Two central and related problems feature prominently in present child
protection law. First, the substantive law is indeterminate; it does not clearly
define when CPS agency and family court intervention is warranted and what
that intervention should entail. Second, in the absence of clear substantive limits
on that intervention, a variety of biases likely infect decisions regarding which
families to intervene in and how. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized these risks
in Santosky v. Kramer, when, addressing standards for terminating the parentchild relationship, it identified “imprecise substantive standards that leave
determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge.”17
This Part introduces those problems via an examination of a single case, In
re A.M., which illustrates how the child protection legal system is infused with
indeterminacy throughout the life of a case, and is subject to biases based on the
race, class, and other elements of the identity of parents involved in the system.
In re A.M. involves a Kansas City area family separated following a single
episode of a mother leaving her four-year-old home alone so she could work.
That single incident caused no injury to the child but led to an extended
separation and, eventually, a termination of the legal relationship between the
mother and child.18 I use this case not to suggest that these outcomes happen in
all cases; indeed, the case itself demonstrates that inconsistent responses occur
in different jurisdictions.19 Rather, I use this case to illustrate what the law
permits to happen, how those outcomes happen in at least some cases, and how
better results depend not on the law but on agencies and courts exercising their
discretion differently.
In re A.M. is a valuable illustration because it is unexceptional in multiple
respects—in the poverty-related conditions which led to a family separation and
prevented authorities from reunifying the family, and the failure of legal
standards to check authorities’ use of the most severe interventions. Tellingly,
Missouri appellate courts saw this case as so mundane that the mid-level Court
of Appeals affirmed it per curiam without a published opinion,20 and the Missouri
Supreme Court summarily denied a request for review,21 reflecting the courts’
view that what happened in this case is both legally permissible and

17. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982).
18. The public record reflects other examples of families separated and children kept in
foster care for extended periods of time on similar fact patterns. See, e.g., Chantel Ross, After
Her Own Experience in Foster Care, Maleeka Jihad Works to Keep Families Intact, IMPRINT
(Oct. 11, 2021, 10:37 AM), https://perma.cc/GMH4-HKU7 (describing a family with five
children removed from their father and kept in foster care for fifteen months when the father
left the children alone to work a night shift as a custodian).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 262-64.
20. In re A.M., 608 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (mem.) (per curiam).
21. In re A.M., 608 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020), transfer denied (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://perma.cc/X8X9-ETJZ (denying parent’s application for transfer from Missouri Court
of Appeals to the Missouri Supreme Court).
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unremarkable.22 The case is exceptional in one respect—it garnered media
coverage from several local outlets when the parent spoke out after losing her
child.23
The case began when Ms. M.24 left her four-year-old daughter home alone
when she went to work one night in 2017. The child, A.M., went to a neighbor’s
apartment, and the neighbor called the police, who took A.M. into custody.25 Ms.
M. did not deny these facts and admitted she made a mistake in leaving A.M.
home alone. She explained that she did not receive any child support from A.M.’s
father,26 limiting her child care options due to cost and, while she had child care
resources, she could not find child care for the night in question: “I felt like I had
no other choice.”27
This incident was the basis of a court finding two months later that Ms. M.
had neglected A.M.28 Missouri law permits courts to enter such findings when
parents “neglect or refuse to provide proper support, education which is required
by law, medical, surgical or other care necessary for his or her well-being” or
when “[t]he child is otherwise without proper care, custody or support.”29 The
publicly-available court records do not further explain the neglect finding; the
court presumably concluded that leaving A.M. home alone at night was a failure
to provide “care necessary for [] her well-being” or a failure to provide “proper
care.”
It is understandable that finding a young child home alone late at night led
child protection officials to investigate. But once the situation became clear—a
financially stressed parent left a child at home so she could go to work—the next
22. In his comment to this Article, David Kelly reports “routinely” hearing complaints
about similar cases when he worked at the U.S. Children’s Bureau. David Kelly, Commentary,
The Harm of Indeterminacy, 33 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022).
23. Laura Ziegler, What the Adoption of One Kansas City Mother’s Child Says About
Race in the Child Welfare System, KCUR (Apr. 1, 2021, 3:00 AM CDT),
https://perma.cc/J28B-HNBJ; Toriano Porter, Why Did a Clay County Judge Terminate
Parental Rights of Immigrant Mother from Kenya?, KAN. CITY STAR (updated Nov. 12, 2020,
10:22 AM), https://perma.cc/3LJB-W443.
24. This Article uses the parent’s initials, consistent with court documents which do not
identify her by name.
25. Ziegler, supra note 23; Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment at
2, In re A.M., WD83215 (Mo. Ct. App. June 23, 2020).
26. A.M.’s father was $11,680 in arrears on his child support obligation. Memorandum
Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 2 n.1.
27. Ziegler, supra note 23; Appellant’s Brief at 4-5, In re A.M., WD83215 (Mo. Ct.
App. Jan. 27, 2020). Ms. M. once told her child that she left her alone because she had to work
to “pay the rent.” Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at
9.
28. The opinion affirming the eventual termination of the legal relationship between
Ms. M. and A.M. refers to this finding as “[t]he court took jurisdiction of A.M.” Memorandum
Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 3. Taking jurisdiction is the
jargon for finding that the facts of the case place the family under the court’s jurisdiction—
which can occur when parents have neglected a child. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031(1) (2021).
29. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031(1)(a)-(b) (2021). This language echoes a separate
statutory definition of neglect. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.110(12) (2021).
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step could have been different. The state could have assisted Ms. M. in finding
stable child care, returned the child home the same day and, with minimal cost
to the state and minimal intervention in the family, quickly closed the case.
Instead, authorities used their discretion at multiple stages—discretion
granted by substantive indeterminacy in child protection law—to keep the child
in its custody and eventually to destroy permanently Ms. M. and her daughter’s
legal relationship. One official involved in this case emphasized the
indeterminacy of child protection law throughout the life of the case, describing
the law this way: “The law, as far as juvenile cases, is not clear cut . . . . They’re
not like criminal cases where you can say, ‘Well, you’ve proved it, here’s the
sentence, off to the department of corrections.’ [These cases] are very
subjective . . . .”30
This subjectivity first played out in the initial remedy ordered—keeping the
child in foster care after the family court determined that Ms. M. had neglected
her daughter. The appellate decision in this case does not reflect why A.M. could
not have quickly returned to Ms. M.’s care under agency and court supervision
to ensure she was not left alone again.31 The appellate decision does reflect a set
of poverty-based challenges—Ms. M., for instance, “was evicted from her
apartment and lived with family or friends until May 2018, when she moved into
an apartment.”32 The appellate court does not state why this should be a reason
to deny A.M. and her mother the ability to live together, or what connection it
had to the reason A.M. was in foster care in the first instance. Whether
homelessness generally equals neglect is a point in some dispute between
states,33 but the court in In re A.M. offers no discussion as to why homelessness
should cause or extend a family separation. In re A.M. is far from the only case
in which housing challenges contribute to family separations. Federally-reported
statistics show inadequate housing is a factor in tens of thousands of children’s

30. Ziegler, supra note 23. The quote is from a supervising juvenile officer in Clay
County, Missouri, in the northeastern portion of the Kansas City metropolitan area, where this
case was heard.
31. Reciting the procedural history when reviewing the ultimate termination of parental
rights, the appellate court simply wrote “the court placed [A.M.] in the custody of the Division
and ordered Mother to participate in services to aid in reunification.” Memorandum
Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 2.
32. Id. at 3.
33. At least one state explicitly provides that homelessness on its own is not neglect.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020(19) (2022). Leading institutional players in the field suggest a
similar view. See, e.g., CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS, STRONG FAMILIES: WHAT DO WE KNOW
ABOUT THE IMPACT OF HOMELESSNESS AND HOUSING INSTABILITY ON CHILD WELFAREINVOLVED FAMILIES? 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/3AES-9ULF. However, at least two states
explicitly treat a child’s homelessness as rendering the child “uncared for” or “dependent” and
thus subject to placement in foster care. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-120(6), 46b-129(j)(2)
(2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-102(1)(e) (2022). For a critique of the child protection
system’s treatment of homeless parents, see Bridget Lavender, Coercion, Criminalization, and
Child ‘Protection’: Homeless Individuals’ Reproductive Lives, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 165268 (2021).
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removals into foster care each year,34 and one study suggests that it keeps up to
30% of children in foster care from returning to their families.35
The subjectivity next played out in the development of Ms. M.’s case plan,
which identified the steps she needed to take to rehabilitate and regain custody
of her child. Authorities used their discretion to impose a case plan which defined
the grounds for intervention broadly, thus permitting greater state intervention
and creating obstacles to family reunification. The plan, as described by the
appellate court, defined “the condition that led to the court’s assumption of
jurisdiction [as] Mother’s failure to provide A.M. a safe and stable home”—not
the more precise cause of inadequate child care.36 In imposing a case plan to
address this amorphous problem, the trial court ordered Ms. M. to obtain a drug
and alcohol abuse assessment and a mental health assessment, despite no
allegation or evidence that the underlying neglect had any relationship to
substance abuse or a mental health condition.37 The case plan expanded the scope
of state intervention in another way—it required Ms. M. to hold stable
employment as a condition of reunifying.38 Unemployment is not a ground for
finding a parent neglectful let alone removing a child, yet through the case plan
employment became a requirement for reunification.39
Having expanded the focus of the case beyond the initial incident involving
inadequate child care, authorities denied the family the ability to reunify because
Ms. M. had not completed the requirements of her case plan.40 Here, the state
child protection agency had an obligation to make “reasonable efforts” to reunify
the family.41 State law defined reasonable efforts as “utiliz[ing] all available
services related to meeting the needs of the juvenile and the family.”42 The state
34. The federal government reported 25,658 children removed from their families and
placed in foster care with housing as a “[c]ircumstance[] [a]ssociated with [c]hild’s [r]emoval”
in fiscal year 2019. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES,
CHILD.’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2019 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 23,
2020, NO. 27, at 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/X76L-95ZV [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT].
35. Deborah S. Harburger with Ruth A. White, Reunifying Families, Cutting Costs:
Housing-Child Welfare Partnerships for Permanent Supportive Housing, 83 CHILD WELFARE
493, 495 (2004). Scholars describe the CPS and homeless services systems as “closely linked.”
Jason M. Rodriguez & Marybeth Shinn, Intersections of Family Homelessness, CPS
Involvement, and Race in Alameda County, California, CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, July 2016,
at 41, 41. Reductions in housing protections trigger concerns about an increase in family
separations via foster care. E.g., Sara Tiano, Resuming Evictions Could Land Kids in Foster
Care, Experts Say, IMPRINT (May 6, 2021, 5:21 PM), https://perma.cc/99N5-4PRM.
36. Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 11.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id.
39. In re A.M. is not alone in requiring parental employment. See, e.g., In re D.M., 851
S.E.2d 3, 8 (N.C. 2020) (describing trial court as denying reunification when a parent was still
“attempting to secure stable housing and employment”).
40. The family court concluded, for instance, that Ms. M. had failed to provide a
sufficiently stable home environment. Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming
Judgment, supra note 25, at 3-5.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.183(1) (2021).
42. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.183(2) (2021) (emphasis added).
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did not provide any assistance with child care arrangements. The state did insist
that Ms. M. obtain a mental health assessment, but as an immigrant,43 she was
ineligible in Missouri for free mental health assessments. The child protection
authorities did not offer to pay for this service which they asserted was essential.
Although the state did not provide assistance for Ms. M. to obtain housing,
child care, or the mental health assessment, the state did pay for some costs of
foster care—under present policies, it pays at least $450 per month to licensed
foster parents so they could take care of a child.44 That cost does not include child
care assistance, which the Missouri Department of Social Services may pay if
the “foster parent needs child care due to employment,”45 nor does it include any
potential adoption subsidies that may have been paid by the state to A.M.’s
adoptive parents after the termination of parental rights was approved and the
adoption finalized.46 The court case did not explore what could have been
accomplished if equivalent funds had been provided to or for Ms. M. In
particular, it did not explore the irony that the state offered financial assistance
to strangers, including for child care, so they could take care of a child who could
have stayed with her mother had the state been willing to provide similar
assistance to her.
As Ms. M., who then lived in the Kansas side of the Kansas City metro
area,47 sought to reunify, the state raised new concerns. Ms. M. became engaged
to a man who later abused her in the presence of her younger son, born
subsequent to A.M.’s removal. The Missouri agency and courts described the
fiancé’s violence as continuing “conditions of a harmful nature” for A.M., and
thus a failure by Ms. M. to provide a “safe and stable home,”48 even though
Kansas domestic violence counselors had described her as “cooperative” and
willing to follow a domestic violence safety plan.49 At no point did any state
authority allege that Ms. M. committed a new act of neglect, and there was never
an adjudication that the domestic violence situation made Ms. M. an unfit parent.
Notably, Kansas authorities did nothing to intervene in Ms. M.’s relationship
with her younger child, declining to exercise their discretion in a manner that
Missouri authorities had.
Based on Ms. M.’s perceived failure to remedy the conditions preventing
reunification, one Missouri state authority then moved to terminate her parental
43. She was authorized to remain in the country lawfully through the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, program. Ziegler, supra note 23.
44. MO. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., CHILD WELFARE MANUAL, § 4, ch. 12.8.1 (2021) (listing
standard payment rates for foster family care). $450 per month is the minimum paid by the
state to foster parents of children aged five or under. Id. The state also pays $320 per year for
clothing, and children classified as having elevated needs come with a higher payment. Id.
45. Id.
46. Adoption Subsidy & Subsidized Guardianship, MO. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS.,
https://perma.cc/EF8S-RECK (archived Apr. 23, 2022); see also 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)
(providing standards for federally reimbursed adoption subsidies).
47. Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 3.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 27, at 8-9.
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rights. After a trial, the Clay County Family Court terminated her rights, which
Missouri appellate courts affirmed.50 These authorities exercised subjective
discretion on multiple topics. The first is whether to give up on reunification and
seek to terminate rights at all. Once the state sought to terminate rights, the court
had to decide whether Ms. M. had failed to rectify the conditions which brought
the child into care.51 Had those conditions been defined by the precipitating
incident—Ms. M.’s leaving her daughter alone while she went to work—the
grounds cited by the court would have been irrelevant. But by defining the issue
more broadly, the court considered the lack of full compliance with the case plan
to determine if she had rectified and if she was likely to do so in the future—
inherently subjective determinations.
The termination decision is notable for other factors it did not consider. First,
there was no allegation that Ms. M. was a danger to her child. The worst that was
said was that she had missed a significant portion of her visits with A.M. (she
asserted she missed some of the visits due to the stillbirth of a child and,
separately, because she was on bedrest to recuperate from knee surgery) and that
after two years separated through foster care, the relationship between her and
her child was strained.52 This was not a case in which the parent had done
something so violent or dangerous, or so emotionally toxic that no relationship
between parent and child could be sustained. Second, there was no consideration
whether a termination of parental rights was necessary to obtain legal
permanency for A.M. Even if A.M. never reunified with her mother, other family
members had come forward who offered to take care of A.M. and could have
done so without terminating A.M.’s legal relationship with her mother.53 Even if
the unrelated foster parents were to raise A.M., they could have pursued
guardianship, which would have granted them legal custody without terminating
parental rights. The court did not ask, let alone answer, why a termination was
necessary.
In the aftermath of the case, media asked whether the state’s destruction of
the M. family was influenced by Ms. M.’s identity as a Black, female immigrant
from Kenya.54 These details are irrelevant to what ought to have been the central
questions in her case—whether she had neglected her daughter and, if so, how to
reunify her family quickly and safely. But participants and observers reasonably
50. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the termination order in an unpublished
memorandum opinion. In re A.M., 608 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (mem.) (per curiam).
The Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, leaving the Missouri Court of Appeals
decision in place.
51. One statutory ground for termination of the parent-child relationship is that the child
has been subject to court jurisdiction for one year and “the conditions which led to the
assumption of jurisdiction still persist . . . [and] that there is little likelihood that those
conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in
the near future.” MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5(3) (2021).
52. See Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 7
(reporting an observation of a single visit which was interpreted to question the remaining
strength of Ms. M. and A.M.’s bond).
53. Ziegler, supra note 23.
54. Id.
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question whether her identity influenced the case. A former case worker
described Ms. M.’s race as a “red flag” to authorities involved.55 Given the
subjectivity described by another actor in the case,56 it is certainly possible that
implicit biases based on her identity led authorities to be more concerned about
Ms. M. than the evidence indicated. After all, in popular culture, leaving a rich,
white, suburban child home alone unsupervised is the concept of blockbuster
family films,57 but leaving a low-income black child home alone for much less
time was the basis for initiating a foster care case. It is also possible that implicit
biases based on Ms. M.’s race made authorities more hesitant to reunify the
family as the case progressed than the evidence warranted.
Negative judgments based on Ms. M.’s sex are also possible. At the start of
the case, Ms. M. was lawfully employed. To the extent parental employment
matters—and there is a strong case it should not—the fact that she was lawfully
employed is all that should be relevant. But Ms. M. was then employed as a
stripper,58 which, as her first caseworker put it, is “a line of work people judge.”59
Sex-based judgments were compounded later in the case when Ms. M. was
living with a fiancé who began to abuse her. A full exploration of the troubled
relationship between domestic violence and the child protection system is
beyond the scope of this Article.60 For present purposes, it suffices to note that
child protection agencies frequently give mothers a “leave ultimatum”61—that is,
55. Id.
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
57. HOME ALONE (Twentieth Century Fox 1990). Tellingly, even when the police
became aware of a child left home alone due to parental negligence, the film never raises the
prospect of child protective agency involvement, and the film’s success suggests audiences
did not question this element of the story. See Kendra Stanton Lee, Check Your White Privilege
with Home Alone, VIDEO LIBRARIAN (Dec. 18, 2020, 12:41 PM), https://perma.cc/M38LJVGB.
58. Some media accounts use the term “dancer,” surely seeking to avoid any judgment
of Ms. M.’s occupation. Porter, supra note 23. I use the term “stripper” not to pass any
judgment on her or on others in that profession, but to more clearly illustrate how authorities
could have judged Ms. M. in part on sex.
59. Ziegler, supra note 23.
60. For one brief view, see Leigh Goodmark, Mothers, Domestic Violence, and Child
Protection: An American Legal Perspective, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 524 (2010). The
child protection system has a history of responding to domestic violence by fathers (and
mothers’ partners) by treating “mothers as the responsible and blameworthy parent.” Joan S.
Meier & Vivek Sankaran, Breaking Down the Silos that Harm Children: A Call to Child
Welfare, Domestic Violence and Family Court Professionals 4 (Aug. 16, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://perma.cc/L9LG-9DVD; see also S. Lisa Washington, Survived and
Coerced: Epistemic Injustice in the Family Regulation System, 122 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 26-34), https://perma.cc/Z5V8-9W6F (criticizing family
court and CPS agency handling of cases involving domestic violence between adults). For a
concise call for changing how the child protection system handles such domestic violence
concerns, see ALAN DETTLAFF, KRISTEN WEBER, MAYA PENDLETON, BILL BETTENCOURT &
LEONARD BURTON, HOW WE ENDUP: A FUTURE WITHOUT FAMILY POLICING 16 (2021),
https://perma.cc/B6QH-9ZSY (calling for an “end [to] the punishment of survivors of intimate
partner violence”).
61. Goodmark, supra note 60, at 526.

230

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 33:217

leave an abusive partner or lose their children. Such an ultimatum reflects the
judgment that leaving is the only proper way to protect children, even though
that judgment is subject to question as a general matter,62 and was questioned by
domestic violence counselors in A.M.’s case.63
Finally, Ms. M.’s immigration status may have shaped authorities’ views of
her. Fears of immigrants and a desire to intervene in immigrant families were
foundational motivations for the child protection system. Family court founders
wrote that “naturally” poor families dominated family courts’ dockets and
approvingly observed that “[i]n many cases the parents are foreigners, frequently
unable to speak English, and without an understanding of American methods and
views,” reflecting an expectation if not an intention to intervene in immigrant
families.64 This statement followed the “orphan trains,” in which children of
immigrants (often not, in fact, orphans) were sent from east coast cities to the
Midwest.65 More recently, advocates have raised concerns that families’
immigration status is used to further the separation of immigrant families.66 There
were no explicit invocations of that history in In re A.M. Nonetheless, her
immigration status made her ineligible for certain case plan requirements to be
paid for by the state, leaving an impoverished parent facing a demand that she
pay for mental health and substance abuse assessments. Rather than require the
state to pay for these (probably unnecessary) assessments, or fault the state for
failing to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family through its failure to pay
for these assessments, the court held this fact against Ms. M. as evidence that she
had failed to rectify conditions which brought the child into care.67 Moreover,
when Ms. M.’s deferred action for childhood arrivals status lapsed (also for
economic reasons—she lacked $800 to renew her status immediately),
immigration authorities detained her after one of the termination of parental
rights hearings68—a circumstance which raises questions about how immigration
authorities became aware of those supposedly confidential proceedings.

62. More than two decades ago, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
judges, wrote that “[m]any children may live safely with non-abusing parents in homes where
domestic violence has occurred,” and called for nuanced case-specific analysis. SUSAN
SCHECHTER & JEFFREY L. EDLESON, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, FAM.
VIOLENCE DEP’T, EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CHILD MALTREATMENT
CASES: GUIDELINES FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 64 (1999), https://perma.cc/JNP7-YFZN.
63. See supra text accompanying note 49.
64. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 116-17 (1909).
65. LAURA BRIGGS, TAKING CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN TERROR 133 (2020).
66. See generally SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RSCH. CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES:
THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM (2011), https://perma.cc/UE5A-M8ZS.
67. A similar fact pattern may apply to parents who cannot obtain court-ordered
assessments due to their poverty. See Jesse Bogan, Missouri Foster Parents Get Help from
Legislature, But Why Are More Children Coming Into State Care?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(June 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/QD3A-M76L (describing one case in which a parent “told the
court she’d been trying to get the evaluation done but couldn’t find a provider available that
accepts Medicaid”).
68. Ziegler, supra note 23.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND RACE, SEX, AND CLASS
INJUSTICE
The subjectivity exercised in In re A.M. was not unique to that case. Rather,
it is the result of the indeterminacy of child neglect and abuse law at every stage
of a foster care case—the vagueness of relevant substantive legal standards that
commentators have observed in child neglect and abuse law since at least 1975,
when Robert Mnookin and Michael Wald published pathbreaking studies on the
topic.69 Scholars in other fields soon echoed these concerns, writing, for instance,
that “[n]owhere are there clear-cut definitions of what is encompassed by the
terms” neglect or abuse.70 The Supreme Court recognized this indeterminacy in
1982.71 The definition of neglect and abuse—which determines when a host of
professionals must report families to child protection agencies, what those
agencies must look for when investigating families, when state authorities may
remove a child from a parent’s custody, and when family courts may take
jurisdiction over a child—remains both broad and vague. Once a family court
has determined a parent has neglected or abused a child, indeterminate standards
govern most of what follows, including whether the child should be placed in
foster care or left at home; what a parent must do before a child in foster care can
return home; how the child protection system should address challenges which
arise during the life of the case; and when the state should stop working towards
reunifying families and towards some other goal. This Part demonstrates the
substantive indeterminacy throughout child protection cases by analyzing each
decision point in those cases.
This analysis has changed somewhat since critiques of indeterminacy were
first raised in the 1970s. Definitions of neglect remain vague, and what
interventions are appropriate for which behaviors remain unanswered by the
substantive law of child protection. But many states now have clearer standards
for when CPS agencies can remove children (when they face some imminent risk
of harm and, in some states, when removal is necessary to prevent that harm).
The law requires CPS agencies to make efforts to prevent the need for removal.72
Procedurally, child protection law has much greater specificity. The law now
prescribes timelines for when courts must hold initial hearings, and trials on state
allegations of abuse or neglect. When children are placed in foster care, the law
provides how quickly state agencies must develop case plans and when family
69. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226; Michael Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 985 (1975). As Mnookin’s article’s title indicates, he first applied the term
“indeterminacy” to this field of law.
70. See, e.g., JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI & ROSINA M. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE
2 (1979); see also id. at xv (arguing that child abuse and child neglect “labels are still
ambiguous, and this ambiguity has hampered efforts to understand the problem better through
research and to ameliorate it through social intervention”).
71. See supra text accompanying note 17.
72. Clare Huntington, The Child-Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 2014, at 221, 221-22 (summarizing changes since 1970s’ critiques).
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courts must hold hearings to review the child’s status in foster care.73 In addition,
the law imposes pressures on parents—to achieve reunification within particular
timelines or face the likelihood that authorities will seek to terminate their legal
relationship with their children.74 But many procedural rules remain unclear, at
least nationally. In particular, significant state-by-state variance exists in the right
to appeal certain decisions—like permanency plan changes away from
reunification, or decisions to not reunify a family.75 The absence of interlocutory
appeals makes it harder for courts to develop the law necessary to provide
substantive guidance to courts in future cases.76
This Part also describes the problematic consequences of the substantive
indeterminacy which marks child protection law—a legal system that creates
highly discretionary decisions which remain subject to multiple forms of bias.
As the Supreme Court recognized, parents subject to child protection cases “are
often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups,” so applying vague
substantive standards renders those cases “vulnerable to judgments based on
cultural or class bias.”77 Those biases are concerning enough. Moreover, as
Mnookin argued in 1975, this indeterminacy leads the legal system to act
inconsistently towards children brought to its attention.78 More recently, as Clare
Huntington has compellingly explained, the child protection system remains
unable to “accurately identify[] which children should be removed from their
homes” on the front end, while timelines for review hearings and permanent

73. Federal law requires state agencies to develop case plans within sixty days of
removing a child. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(2) (2020). Federal law further requires states to hold
review hearings regarding children in foster care at least every twelve months. 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(C)(i). Some state statutes require faster case plans or more frequent hearings. See,
e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-10.1 (2021) (case plans within forty-five days); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-7-1680(A) (2021) (case plans within ten days of removal hearing); D.C. CODE § 162323(a)(1) (2022) (review hearings every six months); MO. SUP. CT. R. 124.01(b) (requiring
dispositional review hearings every 90 to 120 days during a child’s first twelve months in
foster care and every six months thereafter).
74. In particular, CPS agencies must, with certain important exceptions, seek a
termination of parental rights when children have been in foster care for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). Problems with this timeline are discussed
in notes 207-215 below and accompanying text.
75. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases
Between Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 29-32 (2010) (surveying
state statutes and caselaw on appealability of permanency hearing decisions); see also In re
Ta.L., 149 A.3d 1060, 1075 n.16 (D.C. 2016) (en banc) (counting sixteen states permitting
appeals of permanency plan changes from reunification to adoption as of right, twenty-six
states that permit such appeals at the discretion of a trial or appellate court). In recent years,
there has been a slight trend towards permitting more immediate appeals. Id. at 1073-81
(permitting appeal of permanency plan from reunification to adoption); State ex rel. K.F., 201
P.3d 985, 992-96 (Utah 2009) (permitting appeal of permanency plan from reunification to
“individualized permanency”—long-term foster care).
76. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 75, at 50.
77. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
78. Mnookin, supra note 69, at 268-72.
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decisions lead to less frequent reunifications and larger numbers of children
growing up in state custody.79
A. Substantive Indeterminacy Throughout the Life of a Case
1. Substantive Definitions
State statutory definitions of neglect and abuse largely remain indeterminate:
Their language is both broad and vague and permits a wide swath of behavior to
fall within the scope of child maltreatment, especially neglect. A federal report
summarizing state law neglect and abuse definitions accomplishes the task in
four pages.80 These definitions mean the field of child neglect and abuse law has
a broad and indeterminate scope, leaving CPS agencies with wide discretion in
determining when to intervene. As importantly, state neglect and abuse laws do
not establish a hierarchy of more and less severe forms of maltreatment that could
be tied to the type of state interventions, and thus do not limit those interventions
in less severe cases.
These broad definitions shape the scope of the entire child protection system.
Child protection agencies gather allegations of child neglect or abuse from
mandatory reporters—who the law requires to make such allegations when they
reasonably suspect maltreatment has occurred81—and the agencies then screen
out allegations which, even if true, would not rise to neglect or abuse, and
intervene in the rest.82 Finding that neglect or abuse has occurred is a prerequisite
to further intervention, so the broader the definition of neglect and abuse, the
more often those steps will be possible.
The most important substantive definition to examine is neglect because the
vast majority of child protection cases involve allegations of neglect, not abuse.83
Nationally, CPS agencies identify “neglect” as the type of maltreatment at issue
for 74.9% of children they deem maltreated after an investigation.84 Neglect

79. Huntington, supra note 72, at 222.
80. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2-5 (2019), https://perma.cc/6FM48ADY.
81. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310(A) (2021) (requiring listed professionals to
report to the state CPS agency when they have “reason to believe that a child has been or may
be abused or neglected”).
82. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2018, at 6-7 (2020), https://perma.cc/TGT7-CART.
83. Consistent with this point, this Article refers to “neglect and abuse” law. This flips
the order of those terms as they are most commonly used. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT? RECOGNIZING THE SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/JX4G-XZ46.
84. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, at 47 (2021), https://perma.cc/P9JC-UDDQ
[hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019].

234

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 33:217

similarly accounts for three-quarters or more of cases in which CPS agencies
remove children from their families and place them in foster care.85
For at least two generations, scholars and advocates have critiqued neglect
definitions as featuring unduly “broad, vague language, which would seem to
allow virtually unlimited intervention,” as Michael Wald wrote in 1975.86 This
amounted, in Robert Mnookin’s term, to legal “indeterminacy” about when and
how family courts and child protection agencies could intervene in family life.87
The American Bar Association and Institute for Judicial Administration’s
Juvenile Justice Standards Project (on which Wald served as a reporter)
described state laws as using “extremely broad and vague language,” which
“facilitate arbitrary, and even discriminatory, intervention” and interventions
which harm children.88
The state law definition of neglect at issue in In re A.M.—the absence of
“proper care”89—illustrates that vagueness. Other states’ definitions are similarly
vague; limits on the definition come more from requirements that parental
conduct risk harm to the child rather than detailed descriptions of the conduct at
issue. For instance, South Carolina defines “[c]hild abuse or neglect” to include
any failure “to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or
education . . ., supervision appropriate to the child’s age and development, or
health care” that poses a “substantial risk of causing physical or mental injury.”90
The District of Columbia defines neglect to include a child “who is without
proper parental care or control.”91 New York defines a “[n]eglected child” to be
one who has been injured or “is in imminent danger” of injury “as a result of the

85. The federal Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS)
lists “circumstances associated with child’s removal” for all children who entered foster care
in a given year. Multiple “circumstances” can be listed for the same case. In the most recent
year for which data is available, physical abuse was listed in only 13% of removals,
abandonment 5%, sexual abuse in only 4%, and parental death or relinquishment 1% each.
AFCARS REPORT, supra note 34, at 2. The remaining factors all amount to neglect—neglect
(63% of cases), parental drug abuse (34%), “caretaker inability to cope” (14%), housing
(10%), “child behavior problem” (8%), parental incarceration (7%), parental alcohol abuse
(5%), and child disability (2%). Id.
86. Wald, supra note 69, at 1000. Scholars have echoed this argument ever since. E.g.,
Colleen Henry & Vicki Lens, Marginalizing Mothers: Child Maltreatment Registries,
Statutory Schemes, and Reduced Opportunities for Employment, 24 CUNY L. REV. 1, 10
(2021); SHEREEN A. WHITE, IRA LUSTBADER, NICOLE TAYKHMAN, ELISSA GLUCKSMAN HYNE,
MAKENA MUGAMBI, JILL HAYMAN, ASHA MENON & MARISA SKILLINGS, CHILD.’S RIGHTS,
FIGHTING INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AT THE FRONT END OF CHILD WELFARE SYSTEMS: A CALL TO
ACTION TO END THE UNJUST, UNNECESSARY, AND DISPROPORTIONATE REMOVAL OF BLACK
CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES 4 (2021); Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 113, 123-24 (2013).
87. Mnookin, supra note 69, at 230-46.
88. INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASSOC., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT:
STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 52-53 (1981).
89. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 211.031(1)(b), 210.110(12) (2021).
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(6)(a)(iii) (2021).
91. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2022).
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failure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care.”92 Federal
summaries of state neglect definitions add little detail.93 These examples define
neither what “proper” parental action is, nor what counts as an “injury,” nor what
makes a risk of such injury sufficiently “substantial” to make conduct amount to
neglect. These examples are consistent with the statutory illustrations Wald
chose in 1975.94
Case law only somewhat helps define “neglect.”95 Consider this statement
from a leading District of Columbia case: “One cannot determine whether a
child’s welfare requires the intervention of the state . . . by simply examining the
most recent episode. Rather the judge must be apprised of the entire mosaic.”96
At best, this “entire mosaic” rule leaves judges focused on chronic conditions or
repeated behaviors, and with substantial discretion whether to find neglect. That,
in turn, leads to much vagueness about what actually constitutes neglect and
variation by jurisdiction (and by caseworker or judge within jurisdictions). At
worst, the requirement that family court consider the “entire mosaic” of a
family’s life permits wide-ranging invasions of familial privacy without clear
evidence that a specific act of abuse or neglect has even occurred.
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) ongoing work to draft a restatement of
the law regarding children articulates a somewhat more limited understanding of
neglect.97 Taking “physical neglect” as an example, the ALI defines neglect as a
parent failing “to exercise a minimum degree of care” leading to “serious
physical harm” or “a substantial risk of serious physical harm.”98 The ALI

92. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 1012(f) (McKinney 2021).
93. “Neglect is frequently defined as the failure of a parent or other person with
responsibility for the child to provide needed food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or
supervision to the degree that the child’s health, safety, and well-being are threatened with
harm.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, supra note 80, at 2.
94. Wald, supra note 69, at 1000-01.
95. Case law has clarified, for instance, that proof of parental drug use alone does not
prove neglect and instead must be coupled with proof that a parent’s drug use placed children
at risk of imminent harm. In re Dante M., 661 N.E.2d 138, 140-41 (N.Y. 1995). Case law has
also clarified mere exposure of a child to domestic violence directed against a parent does not
constitute neglect. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 2004).
96. In re S.K., 564 A.2d 1382, 1389 (D.C. 1989) (Schwelb, J., concurring). The “entire
mosaic” language is cited repeatedly in District of Columbia abuse and neglect case law. E.g.,
In re Te.L., 844 A.2d 333, 344 (D.C. 2004); In re M.D., 758 A.2d 27, 33 (D.C. 2000); In re
T.G., 684 A.2d 786, 788 (D.C. 1996); In re A.S., 643 A.2d 345, 347 (D.C. 1994); In re O.L.,
584 A.2d 1230, 1233 (D.C. 1990). The American Law Institute has endorsed a similar view,
calling for “a holistic inquiry into the circumstance of the family.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW,
CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.24 cmt. j (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
97. Restatement of the Law, Children and the Law: Status, AM. L. INST.,
https://perma.cc/384J-4SJ2 (archived Apr. 23, 2022). The author joined this project as an
advisor in 2021. Restatement of the Law, Children and the Law: Participants, AM. L. INST.,
https://perma.cc/M6E5-32C6 (archived Apr. 23, 2022).
98. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.24 (AM. L. INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2019).
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acknowledges the breadth of this definition,99 and seeks to narrow it through the
higher standard for risk of harm,100 and requiring parental contact to be “far afield
from the judgment of a reasonable parent.”101 The ALI notes that multiple states
impose a higher bar on parents, permitting even broader grounds for
intervention.102
Statutes in about half of states103 include provisions which seek to distinguish
poverty from neglect. A failure to provide “proper parental care or control” is
only neglect if that failure “is not due to the lack of financial means of [the
child’s] parent, guardian, or custodian.”104 However, studies of this defense do
not indicate that this provision affects many cases. Michele Estrin Gilman
concludes that “the poverty defense rarely succeeds unless the court has a
nuanced understanding of how poverty is related to neglect, which in turn is
sometimes influenced by a judge’s personal ideology.”105 While positive court
decisions do exist,106 Gilman concludes that “most courts . . . easily find noneconomic” grounds to explain parents’ neglect.107 Notably, courts do so through
subjective determinations—what Gilman calls “euphemisms for poverty”—such
as “immaturity, nonchalance, poor decisionmaking, inattentiveness, [and]
instability.”108
Abuse definitions also contain significant breadth and vagueness. Consider
the District of Columbia’s definition: Child abuse includes an “infliction of
physical or mental injury upon a child,”109 with “mental injury” defined to
include a “harm to a child’s psychological or intellectual functioning.”110 The
outer boundaries of such a definition are not immediately clear. Civil child abuse
definitions also typically distinguish between permissible corporal punishment
and impermissible abuse with multi-factor tests,111 though applying those tests

99. See id. at § 2.24 cmt. a (“[T]he category of physical neglect covers a wide range of
parental behavior.”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at § 2.24 cmt. i. “Minimum degree of care” imposes a lesser obligation on
parents than standards of ordinary care. E.g., G.S. v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 723 A.2d 612, 620
(N.J. 1999).
102. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.24 reporter’s note i (AM.
L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
103. Michele Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 495, 520 (2013).
104. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2022); see also, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-720(6)(a)(iii) (2021).
105. Gilman, supra note 103, at 523.
106. Id. at 525-26 (discussing State ex rel. S.M.W., 771 So.2d 160 (La. Ct. App. 2000)).
Notably, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed that intermediate appellate court decision.
State ex rel. S.M.W., 781 So.2d 1223, 1238-39 (La. 2001).
107. Gilman, supra note 103, at 527. This reality does not make the poverty defense
pointless; Gilman emphasizes that it makes a real impact in some cases. Id. at 539.
108. Id. at 529.
109. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(23)(A)(i) (2022).
110. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(31) (2022).
111. For instance, permissible corporal punishment is “reasonable in manner and
moderate in degree” and does not impose “permanent or lasting damage to the child” or reflect
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requires defining phrases such as “reasonable in manner and moderate in
degree.”112 In addition, the category of “abuse” covers any physical or mental
injury, regardless of severity, and thus does not permit legal limits on
interventions for less severe options.
The vagueness of neglect and abuse definitions is evident by comparing it to
criminal codes.113 While the two bodies of law differ—criminal law centers on
punishment and deterrence and usually only addresses intentional acts, while
child protection law seeks to protect children and rehabilitate parents, and is less
concerned about mens rea114—the comparison remains apt. Both civil child
neglect and abuse law and criminal law seek to regulate a wide range of conduct.
Civil child neglect and abuse cases involve allegations of physical abuse, sexual
abuse, one parent’s failure to protect a child from physical or sexual abuse by
another, parental drug abuse, parental mental illness, medical neglect,
educational neglect, and more. Criminal codes cover physical violence, sexual
violence, property crimes, drug crimes, public order offenses, and more. But the
detail with which state statutes define these two broad sets of behavior is
strikingly dissimilar. While states’ criminal codes face justified criticism for
overbreadth,115 they are relatively precise compared with child neglect and abuse
statutes. Their comparative length alone illustrates the point. For instance, one
state defines civil “child abuse or neglect” in eight paragraphs.116 That same state
devotes an entire statutory title to codifying criminal offenses, including
seventeen chapters, most of which include multiple articles.117
Civil child abuse statutes fail to distinguish between various levels of
severity—a crucial distinction from criminal statutes. Criminal codes include
gradations defining multiple levels of severity of assault—often third degree,
second degree, first degree, and aggravated assault.118 Civil child abuse
definitions generally include no such gradations; conduct either is neglect or
abuse or is not. As a result, a criminal defendant’s specific charge or conviction
identifies whether the conduct at issue—and the consequences which follow—
are a bar fight or something more severe. But an allegation or adjudication that a
“reckless or grossly negligent behavior by the parents.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(6)(a)(i)
(2021). Other states have similar statutory provisions. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(23)(B)
(2022).
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(6)(a)(i)(C) (2021); D.C. CODE § 16-2301(23)(B)(i)
(2022).
113. The supervising juvenile officer in Clay County, where In re A.M. was litigated,
made a similar comparison. Ziegler, supra note 23.
114. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.24 cmt. c (AM. L.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (distinguishing criminal and civil child neglect cases).
115. E.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement
Rules, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 352-56 (2019).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(6) (2021). The eight paragraphs include sections 63-720(6)(a)(i) through (vii) and 63-7-20(6)(b).
117. S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 16 (2021). This count excludes drug offenses, which that state
codifies elsewhere. S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 44, ch. 53 (2021).
118. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600 (2021). This statute is typical in its description
of the severity of harm caused by an assault as defining the different degrees.
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parent has physically abused a child does not differentiate excessive corporal
punishment from torture. The absence of categorizing cases as more or less
severe means that a finding of abuse or neglect fails to point to appropriate
dispositions, case plans, or subsequent steps, as the subsections that follow
discuss.
2. Child Neglect and Abuse Registries
Once a child protection agency determines that a parent has neglected or
abused a child, most states place that parent’s name on a child neglect and abuse
registry. Registries are typically confidential, but employers in certain fields—
such as child care; any position in close contact with children; and often any
position in contact with other vulnerable populations, such as elder care—can
determine if job applicants or current employees are on the registry and certain
professional licenses depend on not being on the registry.119 Registry placements
thus seek to protect children and other vulnerable people from potentially
harmful adults.
Registry placements themselves are not examples of indeterminacy; state
laws tend to be clear that any agency-substantiated maltreatment places a parent
on a registry, and keeps them there.120 Rather, registry placements demonstrate
the impact of indeterminate definitions of neglect and placement of all or most
substantiated allegations of neglect on registries. The law in its present form
imposes economic harms on the families impacted by CPS agencies without a
clear connection between administrative or judicial findings of neglect and the
consequences that follow.121
Registry placements harm families by depriving parents of job opportunities
in fields which use registry checks. Those fields are common employers of
lower-income individuals, who populate registries.122 Lost job opportunities can
pressure lower-income parents to “seek work in the underground economy,”123
and, ironically, can hurt children by limiting their parents’ employment
opportunities. With state agencies substantiating neglect or abuse in more than

119. See, e.g., Henry & Lens, supra note 86, at 5-9 (describing the history of expanding
registry checks for child care employment); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.903.2(2) (2021) (placing
parents in substantiated child neglect or abuse cases on the family care safety registry,
accessible to child care, elder care, and other care providing employers).
120. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1302.02 (2022) (requiring information regarding alleged
abuse and neglect to be retained in registry); D.C. CODE § 4-1302.07(a) (2022) (providing that
no substantiated report may be expunged from the registry).
121. Others have criticized the procedures through which many states place parents on
child neglect and abuse registries. E.g., Amanda S. Sen, Stephanie K. Glaberson & Aubrey
Rose, Inadequate Protection: Examining the Due Process Rights of Individuals in Child Abuse
and Neglect Registries, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 857, 864-82 (2020).
122. Henry & Lens, supra note 86, at 3.
123. Id. at 13-14.
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650,000 cases annually,124 the scope of economic harm through these registries
is quite large.
The connection between substantiated neglect and protecting children from
people hired in child care or similar positions is frequently “tenuous.”125
Researchers have identified no studies correlating substantiated maltreatment
allegations with risk to children when parents are later hired in child care.126 If
an adult has sexually abused a step-child, for instance, that individual may pose
a threat to children or vulnerable adults if that person were a child care provider,
home health aide, or in another similar position. In those cases, the risk of future
abuse outweighs the employment cost to the individual adult. But in less severe
cases, the logic of such broad registry placements is hard to decipher and leads
to the critique that registry placements punish parents without protecting
children.127 Consider In re A.M. The Missouri court did find that Ms. M.
neglected her child the night she went to work and left her alone. But it is difficult
to see how this action would make Ms. M. a threat to a child if she sought to
become a teacher, school bus driver, or child care worker, or a threat to
vulnerable elderly individuals if she sought to become a home health aide. The
same is true in other scenarios—parents whose substance abuse problem led to
neglect last year are not necessarily a threat to others now, especially if they have
achieved sobriety. Parents who used excessive corporal punishment on their own
children are not likely a threat to other children as a child care worker or school
bus driver. Parents who neglected a child as teenagers are likely to be more
mature and not a threat to other people’s children by their mid-twenties. Yet
placement of all substantiated cases on registries means the legal system harms
parents and the children who depend on them without analyzing whether the
substantiated maltreatment requires a registry placement.
A small number of states mitigate this problem by creating tiers of
maltreatment with different implications for the registry.128 In California, for
instance, cases involving neglect without any substantiated maltreatment that is
more specific or severe does not lead to a registry placement.129 Michigan places
child maltreatment into five categories, with only the two most severe leading to

124. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 84, at 36.
125. Henry & Lens, supra note 86, at 9. For several examples of registry placements
denying parents employment without protecting children, see Scott Pham, “It’s Like a Leech
On Me”: Child Abuse Registries Punish Unsuspecting Parents of Color, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Apr. 27, 2022, 3:31 AM), https://perma.cc/6236-EHED.
126. Henry & Lens, supra note 86, at 9.
127. See, e.g., DETTLAFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 13 (criticizing registries as imposing
“permanent punishment”).
128. Henry & Lens, supra note 86, at 25.
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170(a)(1)-(2) (West 2022); Henry & Lens, supra note 86,
at 25.
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a registry placement.130 Similar structures exist in Delaware131 and Illinois.132
Under current law, these tiers only impact registry placements. But they
demonstrate that categorizing neglect and abuse by severity—something largely
lacking from neglect and abuse definitions in the vast majority of states, and from
disposition statutes in every state—is possible.
3. Removals
Removal decisions are one area where the law is somewhat more
determinate than it used to be. In 1975, Robert Mnookin proposed permitting
removals only when an immediate and substantial danger to the child exists due
to neglect and abuse, and no reasonable alternative means to protect the child.133
The American Bar Association (ABA) and Institute for Judicial Administration
(IJA) Juvenile Justice Project also suggested that the state should not be
empowered to intervene in a family except when necessary to protect a child.134
States have partly adopted these standards.135 There are greater limits on
removals without court orders—the child protection equivalent of arrest. In this
stage, it is common to have a provision permitting emergency removals only
when they are necessary to prevent an imminent risk of harm from abuse or
neglect.136 These standards nonetheless leave much room for interpretation. What
risk suffices to justify a removal? What is imminent? What alternatives to
removal are strong enough that they must be pursued? Little law exists on these
questions.
There is also strong reason to believe that these limits do not prevent large
numbers of unnecessary family separations. Vivek Sankaran and Christopher
Church have documented how more than 25,000 children each year spend less
than thirty days in foster care, and that a large subset of these children were likely
removed when some other arrangement could have kept them safely with
family.137 Sankaran, Church, and Melissa Carter document how one judge’s
130. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.628d (2022); Henry & Lens, supra note 86, at 25.
131. Delaware creates four tiers of child maltreatment and corresponding rules for
placement on the registry and length of that placement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 923(b)
(2022).
132. Illinois law ties length of registry record retention to severity of maltreatment,
placed into three categories. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7.14 (2021).
133. Mnookin, supra note 69, at 278; Huntington, supra note 72, at 225-26 (describing
how this proposal would work).
134. INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 88, at 75.
135. Huntington, supra note 72, at 229-30. More recently, at least one state has moved
closer to Mnookin’s removal standard. H.B. 1227, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4-5 (Wash. 2021),
Keeping Families Together Act, ch. 211, 2021 Wash. Laws. 1420 (to be codified at WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 22.44.056(1), 26.44.050); see also id. at § 6 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.050(1)(b)) (requiring a court to find “that removal is necessary to prevent imminent
physical harm” before ordering a removal).
136. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-720(A) (2021); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. NEGLECT & ABUSE
PROC. 4(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 13(d).
137. Vivek S. Sankaran & Christopher Church, Easy Come, Easy Go: The Plight of
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unusually strict interpretation of removal standards reduced the number of
children in foster care in New Orleans dramatically, without any data showing
harms to child safety,138 suggesting that many of those removals were
unnecessary.
4. Dispositions
a. Whether to Separate Families
One crucial and continuing element of indeterminacy is the absence of any
direct legal connection between the specific type of child maltreatment
adjudicated and the remedies available. Child protection statutes list various
disposition options—ranging from leaving children at home and terminating
family court jurisdiction to moving children to another adult’s custody to
removing children from their parents and placing them in foster care. Crucially,
all of these dispositions are available following any adjudication.139 The law does
not delineate between neglect or abuse which should not lead to removal and that
which should. Nor does the law provide clear guidance regarding what type of
placement is appropriate when a child is removed from a parent’s custody.
The absence of a substantive connection between the child maltreatment
adjudicated and the dispositions available can be traced to the origin of juvenile
and family courts. The first statute creating modern juvenile courts—Illinois’s
1899 Juvenile Court Act—gave judges discretion to order a range of dispositions
with no provision limiting courts’ discretion regarding which disposition to
impose.140 It provided that whenever a child is “found to be dependent or
neglected . . ., the court may” order any listed option.141 Nothing limited the
dispositions available by the type of maltreatment adjudicated.
This indeterminacy has been critiqued, most prominently in the ABA-IJA
Juvenile Justice Project, which proposed in 1981 that any disposition be
“designed to alleviate the immediate danger to the child, to mitigate or cure any
damage the child has already suffered, and to aid the parents so that the child will
not be endangered in the future.”142 That proposal sought to change the status

Children Who Spend Less Than Thirty Days in Foster Care, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE
207, 209-10 (2016).
138. Melissa Carter, Christopher Church & Vivek Sankaran, A Quiet Revolution: How
Judicial Discipline Essentially Eliminated Foster Care and Nearly Went Unnoticed, 12
COLUM. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 9-17) (on file with author).
139. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2320(a) (2022).
140. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 133 § 7, reprinted in JUV. &
FAM. CT. J., Fall 1998, at 1, 2.
141. Id. The statute does not list leaving the child at home as evidence of neglect, but
the permissive language—”may”—indicates that the court need not tie its disposition to the
type of neglect.
142. INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASSOC., supra note 88, at 128.
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quo of statutes directing family courts to choose whatever disposition judges
believed would serve children’s best interest.143
States did not follow this recommendation, and indeterminacy remains in
disposition statutes, which continue to list a range of disposition options without
tying them to any particular underlying adjudication. Any adjudication for
anything defined as abuse or neglect—whether severe or mild—can lead to an
order removing a child from the child’s family, as the facts of In re A.M. reflect.
Ironically, even those states that distinguish between more and less severe
maltreatment for purposes of their registries144 do not do so for disposition; any
adjudication can lead to any disposition.145
The indeterminacy at disposition presents a stark comparison with criminal
law. Criminal codes not only define different offenses with varying levels of
severity, but they also assign different consequences to those different levels.
This principle is second nature in criminal court—the severity of punishment is
very limited for a defendant convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery in the
third degree, and less limited for a defendant convicted of assault and battery in
the first degree or aggravated assault.146 As a result, whether the state can prove
a defendant guilty of a more severe offense is an issue of great consequence and
helps determine a proportionate response to crime. Similarly, in the large number
of cases resolved via plea bargaining, whether a defendant pleads guilty to a more
or less severe offense is a—often the—critical point negotiated by the state and
defense. Absent a legal connection between adjudicated child neglect or abuse
and dispositions courts may impose, both the specific type of maltreatment and
the state’s evidence of it are less relevant.
In re A.M. illustrates these principles at work. The neglect at issue—leaving
a child home alone in a single instance so the parent, who lacked child care, could
work—is not a particularly severe form of neglect. The parent perpetrated no
violence against the child, there was no allegation that the parent’s conduct
harmed the child, and there was no allegation that this was a repeated instance.
Moreover, Ms. M’s error in judgment was likely informed by financial
desperation—a need to work and a fear of eviction—rather than a more deeply
rooted and problematic condition, such as substance abuse or a serious and
untreated mental health condition. If anything resembling a criminal code
existed, this conduct would have been the equivalent of a misdemeanor, if it
violated the law at all. Yet Ms. M. and A.M. faced the same consequence—
A.M.’s removal and placement in foster care—as would have been likely in the
case of severe abuse.

143. Id. at 129 (“The standard proposed herein specifically rejects the ‘best interest’
test. In its place, the standard provides that the goal of the disposition is to protect the child
from the specific harm justifying intervention.”).
144. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
145. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.18 (2022).
146. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600 (2021).
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b. Where to Place Children Once Families Are Separated
When children are ordered removed, little law governs where family courts
may order them placed. Federal law disfavors congregate care,147 but there is no
federal substantive provision creating any hierarchy between kinship placements
and placing a child in a foster home with strangers. Federal law only requires
states to “consider” giving preference to kin when determining where to place
children that they separate from parents.148 Some states explicitly preference
kinship placements in their statutes or case law,149 but these states are the
exceptions, as most states simply list possible placement options with no
hierarchy among them.150 Even where placement hierarchies exist, vague
substantive standards such as “good cause”151 or weaker152 often permit courts to
divert from those hierarchies.
The general absence of a strong legal preference for kinship placements is
glaring. Social science evidence shows the value of kinship placements over
others.153 Children in kinship foster care have significantly more stable
placements—they are less likely to have to leave their initial placement for
another temporary placement and less likely to experience multiple moves from
one foster placement to another.154 In addition, children in kinship care are more
147. Federal funding rules now limit reimbursement for congregate care facilities by
imposing a set of requirements on such facilities and procedures for placement in them. 42
U.S.C. § 672(k)(2)-(4).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19).
149. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-514(B) (2021) (creating “order for placement
preference”); FLA. STAT. § 39.521(3) (2021) (creating placement hierarchy of parents, other
kin, and agency custody); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-609(b) (2022) (same); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419B.192(1) (2021) (preference for kinship placement); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1680(E)(1)
(2021) (requiring agency placement plan to give “preference” to a kinship placement absent
“good cause to the contrary”); W. VA. CODE § 49-4-604(c) (2020) (providing “sequence” of
dispositional options to consider); In re J.W., 226 P.3d 873, 881 (Wyo. 2010) (finding “a
compelling preference” for “placement with nuclear or extended family members”); WASH.
REV. CODE § 13.34.130(3) (2022) (requiring placement with a relative absent a risk to the
“health, safety, or welfare of the child”).
150. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2320(a)(3)(A) (2022) (disposition statute that does not
preference kinship placements); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-212(a)(2) (2021) (same); ME. STAT.
tit. 22, § 4036(1) (2021) (same); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.181.1 (2021) (same); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-438(3) (2021) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A) (West 2021) (same);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6351(a) (2021) (same).
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1680(E)(1) (2021).
152. Arizona courts have ruled that family courts need not even make a best interest
finding in diverting from placement hierarchies; the court need only “include placement
preference in its analysis of what is in the child’s best interest.” Antonio P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 187 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
153. Judge Leonard Edwards aptly summarizes some of this data in his comment to this
Article. Leonard Edwards, Commentary, Comments on “Confronting Indeterminacy and Bias
in Child Protection Law” by Josh Gupta-Kagan, 33 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE
(forthcoming 2022).
154. See, e.g., Eun Koh, Permanency Outcomes of Children in Kinship and Non-Kinship
Foster Care: Testing the External Validity of Kinship Effects, 32 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV.
389, 390 (2010) (collecting studies); id. at 393, 396 (reporting findings in his five-state study
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likely to feel that they belong with the family they live with than children in nonkinship care.155 Moreover, placement decisions early in a case may effectively
decide the child’s permanent family—if reunification does not occur, then the
long-standing foster parent is likely first in line to become an adoptive parent or
guardian.156
In the absence of substantive legal standards preferencing kinship care over
placement with strangers, and with statutes that include a category for placing
children in agency custody,157 child protection agencies have wide discretion to
determine where foster children live. That discretion has led to wide variation in
the proportion of foster children placed with kin—ranging in one year from 2%
in one state to 46% in another.158 A strong kinship placement preference can
increase those rates to as high as two-thirds or more.159
The absence of a meaningful kinship placement preference came to light via
the death of Ma’Khia Bryant, a Black foster child in Ohio (a state with no kinship
placement preference160) shot to death by police during an incident outside her
non-kinship foster home.161 After the CPS agency removed Ma’Khia from her
mother, it placed her with her grandmother, where she stayed for the next sixteen
months. But when her grandmother’s landlord discovered Ma’Khia was there,
he evicted the family. Rather than help the grandmother defend against the
eviction or obtain alternative family housing, or even permit the grandmother to
with matched samples); Marc A. Winokur, Graig A. Crawford, Ralph C. Longobardi &
Deborah P. Valentine, Matched Comparison of Children in Kinship Care and Foster Care on
Child Welfare Outcomes, 89 FAMILIES SOC’Y 338, 341-42 (2008).
155. Eun Koh & Mark F. Testa, Propensity Score Matching of Children in Kinship and
Nonkinship Foster Care: Do Permanency Outcomes Still Differ?, 32 SOC. WORK RSCH. 105,
115 (2008).
156. When reunification is not possible, the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges has adopted a preference for “adoption by the relative or foster family with whom
the child is living.” BARBARA SEIBEL, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, ADOPTION
AND PERMANENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 14 (2000).
157. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2320(a)(3)(A) (2022); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-212(a)(2)(B)
(2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.181.1(2) (2021).
158. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STATES’ USE OF WAIVERS OF NON-SAFETY LICENSING
STANDARDS FOR RELATIVE FOSTER FAMILY HOMES 6-7 (2011), https://perma.cc/EF8J-PJ4D.
159. See Leonard Edwards, Relative Placement: The Best Answer for Our Foster Care
System, 69 JUV. & FAM. CT. J., no. 3, 2018, at 55, 59 (describing Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania); Edwards, supra note 153, at 7 (asserting that “[s]everal model counties have
demonstrated that they can place children with relatives in over 80% of their dependency
cases”).
160. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
161. The facts in this paragraph are taken from the New York Times’ exhaustive account
of her case. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Ellen Barry & Will Wright, Ma’Khia Bryant’s
Journey Through Foster Care Ended with an Officer’s Bullet, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2021),
https://perma.cc/H7BF-WLPY. For a critique of the handling of kinship care in Ma’Khia’s
case and an argument to “exhaust all other options” before placing a child with strangers, see
Vivek Sankaran, Ma’Khia Bryant’s Story Reveals Flaws in Foster Care System, IMPRINT
(May 31, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://perma.cc/5ENV-3EVW.
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take the children into a hotel temporarily while she sought alternatives—all steps
a meaningful kinship placement preference might have required—the agency
took Ma’Khia away from her grandmother and placed her with strangers. A
series of short-term placements followed, ultimately leading to the turbulent final
placement and death at the hands of police. The case did not need such a tragic
end to underscore the point that the law did not protect Ma’Khia’s ability to live
with her grandmother rather than strangers.
5. What Happens Once a Child Is in Foster Care?
a. What Should a Case Plan Require a Parent to Do?
When a child enters foster care, federal law requires CPS agencies, jointly
with the parent,162 to create a “case plan . . . for assuring that . . . services are
provided to the parents, child, and foster parents in order to improve the
conditions in the parents’ home [and] facilitate return of the child to his own safe
home.”163 The case plan defines what parents must do to reunify with children
and how CPS agencies monitor parents’ actions, and is thus “a critical stage in
the proceeding with profound long-term implications for all that follows.”164
When a case plan addresses the issues that keep a parent and child from
reunifying and progress is clearly measured, what happens subsequently in court
is “anti-climactic.”165 But “[a]n ill-advised case plan not only wastes money; it
wastes the most precious commodity in the field: time.”166 Poor case plans can
require parents to do unnecessary tasks—tasks that slow down reunification or,
if parents fail to complete them, prevent reunification entirely. Case plans that
fail to address the actual cause of maltreatment could lead to a recurrence of
maltreatment after reunification.
These requirements provide another example of a determinate procedural
requirement—create a case plan within a set time frame167—coupled with
substantive indeterminacy—the case plan should be about “facilitat[ing]”
reunification,168 with little elucidation of what the plan should or should not
include. Federal regulations require simply that a case plan must “[i]nclude a
description of the services offered and provided . . . to reunify the family.”169
State laws and policies make clear that case plans should both describe “the
162. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(1) (2020).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1).
164. Martin Guggenheim, How Family Defender Offices in New York City Are Able to
Safely Reduce the Time Children Spend in Foster Care, 54 FAM. L.Q., no. 1, 2020, at 1, 31.
165. Id. at 12; see also LEONARD EDWARDS, REASONABLE EFFORTS: A JUDICIAL
PERSPECTIVE 21 (2014) (ebook) (describing case planning as “integral”).
166. Guggenheim, supra note 164, at 31.
167. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, CASE PLANNING FOR FAMILIES INVOLVED WITH CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 2 (2018),
https://perma.cc/FB79-M2NZ (summarizing state case plan requirements).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B).
169. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(4) (2020).
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problems that led to the family’s involvement” in foster care “and the services
that will be provided to the parents to address those problems”—but without
limits on how those “problems” and “services” should be defined.170 At least one
state’s case law provides that case plan services should not “consist of ‘a litany
of required services . . . not related to the conditions that eventually gave rise to
the dependency adjudication.’”171 But even this case cautioned that the
conditions leading to state intervention must not be read “narrowly.”172
It is thus effectively up to CPS agencies drafting case plans and family courts
approving them to determine what is required for a family to reunify, because
the law does not tether case plan requirements to the neglect or abuse that was
actually adjudicated. This can result in agencies setting a standard for
reunification higher than the standard for removal, with parents required to take
steps that are often about finances (obtain a job and housing, for instance) or
other issues unrelated to the reason for the child’s presence in foster care. This
substantive indeterminacy permits what occurred in In re A.M.—a case about a
parent’s single instance of poor judgment in the face of inadequate child care to
grow into a case about providing a “safe and stable home” more generally, and a
long list of requirements before reunification could occur, like a mental health
assessment, that bore little connection to the underlying incident.173 A more
determinate standard would require a closer connection between the specific
neglect or abuse adjudicated and the requirements for reunification.
b. When Should a Court Reunify a Family?
Reunification of families separated through foster care is the default goal of
every foster care case and the most common outcome for any child placed in
foster care.174 Federal law requires states to hold hearings to determine
“whether . . . the child will be returned to the parent,” but does not provide a

170. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES,
CHILD.’S BUREAU, supra note 167, at 3 (noting no principles to limit issues identified as the
“problems” that need to be addressed).
171. In re Child of E.V., 634 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting In re
Welfare of M.A., 408 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)). Some commentators suggest
that there should be a connection between the reason for a removal of a child to foster care
and the services called for in the plan. Judge Leonard Edwards, for instance, writes that a case
plan “must identify the problem which caused the removal as well as the goals and services
which will enable the parent to remedy those problems.” EDWARDS, supra note 165, at 51
(emphasis added). Perhaps tellingly, no authority is cited for that proposition.
172. In re Child of E.V., 634 N.W.2d at 447 n.3 (quoting In re Welfare of D.D.K., 376
N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)). In addition, this case only arose in a later termination
of parental rights appeal, In re Child of E.V., 634 N.W.2d at 445, meaning the over-broad case
plan was in effect until then.
173. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
174. Reunification accounted for 47% of all exits from foster care in fiscal year 2019.
The next most frequent outcome, adoption, accounted for 26% of all exits. AFCARS REPORT,
supra note 34, at 3.
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substantive standard for when courts should order reunification to occur175—
another example of procedural clarity with little substantive guidance, which
leaves CPS agencies and family courts with wide discretion to reunify or not as
they deem appropriate.176
Long-standing case law provides modest guidance—the question of whether
to reunify a family should bear some connection to the maltreatment that forms
the basis of the original foster care placement. In 1899, the high court of New
York State addressed when parents and children are legally entitled to reunify in
In re Knowack.177 A key fact was uncontested—the original ground for removal
of the Knowack children from their parents “has been fully and absolutely
removed.”178 The New York Court of Appeals ordered the family reunified,
explaining that the power to intervene in family life is “limited by the necessities
of the case.”179
Despite the “necessities” language, In re Knowack left open questions. If a
parent’s unfitness has only been partly—not “fully and absolutely”—
rehabilitated, should reunification occur? If one form of unfitness is adjudicated,
but the state agency is concerned about another form, is rehabilitation of the first
issue sufficient to require reunification? How exactly is the “necessit[y]” for state
custody defined? Nearly one and a quarter centuries later, these questions remain
largely in the discretion of CPS agencies and family court judges.180 Again, In re
A.M. is illustrative, as the issues that authorities cited to avoid reunification were
distinct from the lack of child care and Ms. M.’s decision to leave her child alone
so she could go to work. No law required a new finding of neglect for authorities’
concern about domestic violence in that case, and no law required the conditions
imposed upon her be proven to connect to the underlying “necessity” of family
separation.

175. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
176. Some state statutes impose some standard—such as California’s which requires
reunification after a child spends eighteen months in foster care unless the state shows “that
return of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.22(a) (West
2022); see also Georgeanne G. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 53 Cal. App. 5th 856, 864, 870
(Ct. App. 2020) (describing this standard “as a fairly high one” and applying it to overturn a
trial court decision keeping a child in foster care).
177. 53 N.E. 676 (N.Y. 1899).
178. Id. at 676-77. The record further revealed “that the children are all anxious and
desirous of returning to the home of their parents.” Id. at 677.
179. Id. at 678.
180. See, e.g., Clare Ryan, Children as Bargaining Chips, 68 UCLA L. REV. 410, 440
(2021) (describing Connecticut reunification statute as “giv[ing] the court significant
discretion to require the parent to alter their behavior, living conditions, and other aspects of
their lives before reunification”).
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c. When Should a Court Change a Child’s Permanency Plan from
Reunification to Something Else?
When reunification does not occur, child protection law requires family
courts to determine whether to keep working towards or give up on reunification.
Decisions to shift away from reunification signify the determination that
reunification is unlikely and a new permanent family structure is required, and
trigger changes to other agency legal obligations.181 Agencies must make
reasonable efforts to achieve whatever the permanency plan is. When it is
reunification, agencies must work “to make it possible for a child to safely return
to the child’s home.”182 But once a court changes the plan away from
reunification, the agency’s legal obligation changes; it must now “complete
whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.”183
This decision also illustrates the procedural clarity and substantive
indeterminacy that marks child neglect and abuse law—state courts must hold
permanency hearings whenever a child is in foster care for at least one year, and
these hearings must determine what a child’s permanency plan ought to be—
generally, reunification, adoption, or guardianship.184 But—beyond the
implication from these procedural timelines that reunification efforts should be
time-limited—the law does not prescribe a substantive standard for when family
courts should move away from reunification. To illustrate what actions this
permits courts to take, one Pennsylvania appellate court approved shifting a
permanency plan away from reunification based on subjective judgment about
how a parent’s obesity affected his ability to raise his children.185
Absent clear law regarding when to shift away from reunification, CPS
agencies and courts have significant discretion. In In re A.M., Ms. M. recalled
feeling blindsided in a meeting with a caseworker, who had lauded her progress
in previous meetings but suddenly advocated for a switch to adoption (complete
with terminating her parental rights).186 Her surprise is understandable. The law
provides no standard for when authorities should move away from reunification
as a goal. In her case, authorities were concerned less about the absence of child
care that led to the child’s initial placement into foster care than about other
factors.187 The law’s indeterminacy permitted authorities to use those concerns
to stop working to reunify Ms. M. and her daughter.

181. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 75, at 35-40 (describing wide ranging impacts of
permanency plan changes).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
185. Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment at 13-15, In re Z.B., JS27002-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2021)
186. Ziegler, supra note 23.
187. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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d. What Should a Permanency Plan Be if Not Reunification?
One area where the law does not suffer from indeterminacy relates to what
permanency plans should be if not reunification. Federal law generally provides
for two permanency options188 other than reunification—termination of the
parent-child relationship and creation of a new parent-child relationship through
adoption, or creation of a family with guardianship, which grants the guardian
legal custody but does not terminate the parent-child relationship189—and favors
adoption. Federal statutory law requires190 a CPS agency to determine that
“[b]eing returned home or adopted are not appropriate permanency options for
the child” before pursuing guardianship.191 This hierarchy is visible in In re A.M.
Even assuming that the child could not return to her mother, it was not clear that
terminating the parent-child relationship was necessary because the authorities
could have pursued guardianship. The appellate court decision affirming the
termination did not consider whether termination was necessary to achieve
permanency with either caretaker, nor did relevant state law require such
consideration.192

188. The law also recognizes “another planned permanent living arrangement”
(APPLA). 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C). APPLA generally means remaining in foster care without
any permanent family relationships until the child turns eighteen (or in some states, twentyone) and emancipates from foster care, as about 20,000 young adults do every year. AFCARS
REPORT, supra note 34, at 3. The law disfavors APPLA—courts can only select it after ruling
out other options, and only if the child is sixteen or older. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C). APPLA’s
disfavored status rests in research associating growing up in foster care with a range of poor
outcomes, including less post-secondary education, employment, and housing stability, and
more public assistance use and criminal justice system involvement. See, e.g., MARK E.
COURTNEY, AMY DWORSKY, ADAM BROWN, COLLEEN CARY, KARA LOVE & VANESSA
VORHIES, MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH:
OUTCOMES AT AGE 26, at 6 (2011), https://perma.cc/QU39-5UEC.
189. Federal law defines guardianship as “a judicially created relationship between child
and caretaker which is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining as evidenced by the
transfer to the caretaker of the following parental rights with respect to the child: protection,
education, care and control of the person, custody of the person, and decisionmaking.” 42
U.S.C. § 675(7).
190. This requirement is for state agencies to be able to receive federal reimbursement
for some costs of guardianship subsidies. The provision preferencing adoption appears in a
section governing state agency eligibility for federal support of any subsidies paid to
guardians. 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(1)(A).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(3)(A)(ii); see also 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(F)(i) (requiring case plan
for a child with a goal of guardianship to include “a description of [] the steps that the agency
has taken to determine that it is not appropriate for the child to be . . . adopted.”). Four states
have statutes stating an explicit preference for terminating the parent-child relationship and
pursuing adoption over guardianship. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(b) (West 2022);
FLA. STAT. § 39.621(3) (2021); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 702(C) (2021); MINN. STAT.
§ 260C.513(a) (2021). At least two states list permanency with kinship caregivers—whether
through guardianship or adoption—as preferrable to permanency with someone else. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(c) (2020); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-823(e)(1) (West
2022). But these states must still follow the federal hierarchy and rule out adoption before
being able to access federal financial support for guardianship subsidies.
192. Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 10-14;
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This legal hierarchy exists despite data demonstrating that guardianships are
just as stable and permanent in practice as adoptions are,193 and that adoption
disruptions (like guardianship disruptions) occur in a significant percentage of
cases.194 Moreover, guardianships are less invasive because they do not require
terminating parent-child relationships, which is itself an important value. The
federal Children’s Bureau recognized this evidence in a 2021 guidance
document.195 The Children’s Bureau wrote that “[c]hildren have inherent
attachments and connections with their families of origin that should be protected
and preserved whenever safely possible.”196 The Children’s Bureau went further,
suggesting both that adoption and termination of parental rights should be
reserved for cases when those steps are necessary for children’s safety, and that
potential adoptive parents should be counseled to seek guardianship:
Pre-adoptive families who wish to sever the child’s family connections for
any reason other than safety should receive training and supportive counseling
to understand the impact that will have on the child. Decisions for adoption
finalization should be contingent upon whether the family will in fact support
what is best for the child in preserving connections.197
This guidance does not explicitly question the statutory hierarchy of
adoption over guardianship (and the Children’s Bureau could not frontally
assault on the statute it is charged with implementing), but it questions the
foundations of that hierarchy.

MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.7 (2021).
193. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE KINSHIP
GUARDIANSHIP ASSISTANCE PAYMENT (KIN-GAP) PROGRAM 5, 15 (2006) (finding that that
5.9% of children who left foster care to subsidized guardianship subsequently re-entered foster
care and noting that some of these re-entries might be “positive,” such as a re-entry to facilitate
reunification with a parent). Mark F. Testa, The Quality of Permanence—Lasting or Binding?
Subsidized Guardianship and Kinship Foster Care as Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 499, 526-27 (2005) (finding in Illinois that guardianship does not render a child’s
placement any less stable than adoption). The federal government summarized research as
showing no statistically significant differences in the number of children who re-entered foster
care after a guardianship compared with after an adoption. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS:
SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS 18-20 (2011).
194. Data is summarized in U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD.
& FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, DISCONTINUITY AND DISRUPTION IN ADOPTIONS AND
GUARDIANSHIPS 3-6 (2021), https://perma.cc/4TE9-KVDF. 10 to 25% of pre-adoptive
placements disrupt before adoptions are finalized, id. at 6, and up to 10% of adopted children
(in finalized adoptions) re-enter foster care, id. at 4.
195. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAM., CHILD.’S
BUREAU, ACYF-CB-IM-21-01, ACHIEVING PERMANENCY FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN
AND YOUTH 2 (2021), https://perma.cc/KNS6-G7G9 [hereinafter ACHIEVING PERMANENCY].
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id. at 19.
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e. When Should a Court Terminate the Legal Relationship Between
Parents and Children?
Child protection law has grown more determinate in one area that is both
procedural and substantive—the controversial198 federal rule requiring, with
certain exceptions, state child protection agencies to seek to terminate parentchild relationships199 when children have been in foster care for fifteen of the
previous twenty-two months.200 This provides both a procedural rule—initiate a
process for a court to consider such terminations—and a strong substantive
nudge that after fifteen months in foster care authorities should move away from
reunification and towards termination and adoption.201 Consistent with this
nudge, terminations are frequent—courts terminate the legal relationship
between parents and about one quarter of all children who enter foster care, and
most of these terminations happen within two years of entering foster care.202
This more determinate rule (and the similarly determinate preference for
adoption over guardianship) cannot be separated from its context in an
indeterminate legal structure. A child spending time in foster care under
indeterminate standards triggers application of the more determinate rules, which
transform a case into the most severe form of state intervention in families.
In re A.M. illustrates the impact of the 15-of-22 month rule. In that case,
authorities filed a termination petition consistent with this timeline,203 with a key
player reportedly stating on that timeline: “This isn’t going anywhere, I’m going
to reach out to my lawyer to talk about TPR.”204 That quote encapsulates the
message of the 15-of-22-month rule—if a parent has not been able to reunify (or
come close to doing so) on that timeline, reunification is so unlikely that pursuing
a termination is the presumptive next step.
198. This rule has attracted increasing criticism. See infra note 315 and accompanying
text. This Article proposes replacing it with much more restrictive grounds for terminating
parent-child relationships. Infra Part V.F.
199. Such actions are frequently referred to as “termination of parental rights” or TPR
cases. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 750, 760, 765 (1982). I use the phrase
“terminate parent-child relationships” for several reasons. First, it more completely
encapsulates what is terminated—both parents’ rights to their children, but also children’s
relationship with their parents—and a crucial question in any termination case is whether
terminating both parts are necessary, especially because parental rights can be limited without
terminating children’s legal relationship with their parents. Second, it is occasionally the
technical statutory term used. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2353 (2022) (“Grounds for
termination of parent and child relationship.”).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
201. Adoptions and terminations are closely linked; a termination of one parent-child
relationship permits the creation of a new one through adoption.
202. ACHIEVING PERMANENCY, supra note 195, at 8-9.
203. The child was removed in September 2017 and the termination petition filed in
February 2019—seventeen months later. Federal regulations define the fifteen-month timeline
as beginning upon the date the child is “considered to have entered foster care,” 45 C.F.R.
§ 1356.21(i)(1)(i)(A) (2020), which in turn is defined as sixty days after a child’s removal. 42
U.S.C. § 675(5)(F); 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2020).
204. Ziegler, supra note 23.
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The 15-of-22-month rule does have some limitations which add
indeterminacy. First, its scope remains vague; exceptions include anytime the
child is living with a relative and any other “compelling reason” can support an
exception.205 Second, this rule does not actually require terminations to occur.
Rather, it requires agencies to file for terminations,206 saying nothing about how
courts should respond to such filings.
Despite this remaining indeterminacy, the 15-of-22-month rule represents a
rare case of providing substantive guidance, and, like the law’s preferencing of
adoption over guardianship, this substantive rule has garnered well-justified
criticism. As state agencies and family courts increased their use of terminations
in the 1990s, critics established that this increased use undermined the goals of
achieving permanency, because adoptions did not keep pace with terminations,
and the result was an increasing number of legal orphans—children who had no
legal parent (due to a termination) and no new parent (because no adoption
occurred).207 Seeking terminations based on a child’s time in foster care rather
than the likelihood of adoption increases the risk that the terminations would
simply create legal orphans. Indeed, between 2010 and 2019, the federal
government reported 89,800 more terminations than adoptions—meaning courts
terminated the parent-child legal relationship without creating a new parent-child
relationship for 89,800 children.208 And a large number of children remain in
foster care with their legal relationship with their parents terminated and not
adopted by new parents—73,200 in 2020.209 Such critics recommended two
important principles to limit terminations: (1) no termination should occur unless
the state can prove “a high probability for adoption exists” (presumably through
the identification of a prospective adoptive family) and (2) that “termination is
necessary to promote the child’s welfare.”210
Recent federal guidance expands the concerns about using termination too
frequently. Following these concerns about overuse of terminations, advocates
have begun seeking a repeal of the 15-of-22-month rule,211 and the federal
government has issued guidance urging state authorities to limit that rule by
using exceptions to it.212 The federal guidance advises states against wide use of
terminations in multiple ways: States should work “to expand family

205. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
207. Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination
of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 121, 132-34 (1995).
208. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION: FY 2010-FY 2019, at 1 (2020),
https://perma.cc/CF9Y-QAH7. Statistics were calculated based on subtracting the total
number of adoptions for those years from the total number of terminations. In percentage
terms, 14% of all children who were subject of terminations were not subsequently adopted.
209. ACHIEVING PERMANENCY, supra note 195, at 16.
210. Guggenheim, supra note 207, at 135.
211. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
212. ACHIEVING PERMANENCY, supra note 195, at 3.
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relationships, not sever or replace them,”213 and states should consider safety and
children’s relationships “rather than the number of months spent in foster care,
or even a child’s new attachment to resource [foster] parents,”214 and “not to
place timeliness before the substance of what best supports familial relationships
and the best interest of the child.”215
6. Reasonable Efforts to Preserve and Reunify Families
Since 1980, Congress has required states to make “reasonable efforts” to
prevent children’s entry into foster care and to reunify them with their families
when the agencies removed them.216 Congress’s goal was straightforward—
ensure children did not enter foster care when they could have remained safely
with their families, and for CPS agencies to work expeditiously to reunify
families when a removal was required, and thus keep the number of children in
foster care relatively low.217 However, Congress did not define the phrase
“reasonable efforts,” leaving an indeterminate standard to perform ambitious
goals.218
Other sources of law did not fill the gap. The Children’s Bureau—the federal
sub-agency charged with implementing federal child protection statutes—has
also declined to promulgate regulations offering any further definition of
reasonable efforts.219 Some state legislatures have adopted reasonable efforts
definitions, but those “typically restate the federal language with the addition of
more general terms,” providing courts with “little guidance.”220 Reasonable

213. Id. at 10.
214. Id. at 11.
215. Id. at 22. This reference to timeliness came in the context of a discussion of
termination timelines, and a reference to 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E), which includes the 15-of-22month rule.
216. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 101,
94 Stat. 500, 501 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)).
217. In re James G., 943 A.2d 53, 69-70 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (describing
legislative intent); see also Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think,
36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 324-25 (2005) (noting congressional record of concerning numbers
of children staying in foster care rather than reunifying quickly); Will L. Crossley, Defining
Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child Protection
Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT’L L.J. 259, 269-72 (2003) (describing goal of ensuring minimum
quality of family preservation and reunification services).
218. In 1997, Congress modestly amended the reasonable efforts statute to emphasize
that “the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern” in a reasonable efforts
finding. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116
(1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A)) (“Clarification of the reasonable efforts
requirement.”); Bean, supra note 217, at 326. Beyond offering this truism, however, the
statutory text did not further specify what “reasonable efforts” meant, leaving a largely
indeterminate standard in place.
219. Title VI-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family Services State
Plan Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. 50058, 50073 (Sept. 18, 1998). The resulting federal regulations
do not offer a definition of “reasonable efforts.” 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b), (d) (2020).
220. EDWARDS, supra note 165, at 29.
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efforts rarely become the subject of appellate case law, with parents’ attorneys
rarely raising challenges.221 The result is indeterminacy; “reasonable efforts”
remains undefined and described by courts as “amorphous.”222
In the federal statutory scheme, federal reimbursements to state CPS
agencies depend on state court judges finding that the agencies made reasonable
efforts.223 That is, state courts’ reasonable efforts decisions determine whether a
state agency will receive federal funding,224 creating an incentive for judges to
find in the affirmative so that state agencies do not lose federal funds.225
This mix of an indeterminate substantive standard and incentives to help
state CPS agencies obtain federal funding has rendered reasonable efforts a weak
accountability tool. Federal evaluations of state efforts reveal a dysfunctional
system. The federal Child and Family Services Reviews—close federal reviews
of a random sampling of state CPS agency case files—found that states failed in
51% of cases to make adequate efforts to reunify families.226 Agencies frequently
failed to provide adequate trauma-informed services (especially to assist parents,
many of whom have experienced traumas) as well as basic assistance with
transportation and visitation.227 Agencies failed in 58% of cases to assess parents’
service needs adequately.228
Despite that epidemic of failures to make reasonable efforts, state family
courts fail to hold CPS agencies accountable.229 In one detailed 2005 Michigan
survey, 90% of judges stated that they “rarely” or “never” made findings that the
agency failed to make reasonable efforts—a pattern inconsistent with the breadth
of reasonable efforts failures documented by federal authorities.230 And a
shocking 40.5% of judges “admitted to having at some time made affirmative
findings when DHS had failed to make reasonable efforts.”231 A set of older

221. Leonard Edwards, Ignoring Reasonable Efforts: How Courts Fail to Promote
Prevention, IMPRINT (Dec. 5, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/36AF-ND3F.
222. E.g., In re Shirley B., 18 A.3d 40, 53-54 (Md. 2011) (quoting In re Shirley B., 993
A.2d 675, 710 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010)).
223. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(1)(ii), (b)(2)(ii) (2020).
224. In re James G., 943 A.2d 53, 76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
225. Some state legislatures have codified a prohibition on courts considering federal
funding in reasonable efforts decisions. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-816.1(d)
(West 2022). Those legislatures doth protest too much; this codification suggests a concern
that courts would, in fact, do exactly what was prohibited.
226. ACHIEVING PERMANENCY, supra note 195, at 13.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 14.
229. Sankaran & Church, supra note 137, at 210; see also Deborah Paruch, The
Orphaning of Underprivileged Children: America’s Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 119, 136 (2006) (“[J]udicial findings of reasonable efforts [are] often made
by judges by rote.”).
230. MUSKIE SCH. OF PUB. SERV., CUTLER INST. CHILD & FAM. POL’Y, AM. BAR ASSOC.,
CTR. ON CHILD. & THE LAW, MICHIGAN COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM REASSESSMENT 105
(2005).
231. Id. The survey asked judges: “How often do you make affirmative findings when
you believe [the agency] failed to make reasonable efforts?”
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studies in multiple jurisdictions reached similar conclusions.232 One retired judge
has candidly faulted other judges who avoid making a findings of no reasonable
efforts for fear of depriving CPS agencies of federal funds,233 and a range of
states have formal partnerships between judicial branches and CPS agencies to
maximize federal funds.234 More recently, federal officials have written that
“evidence remains scarce based on . . . court observation work conducted across
the country by Court Improvement Programs . . . that either reasonable efforts
determination [to prevent removal and, when a child is in foster care, to finalize
the permanency plan] is treated with the rigor or seriousness required under the
law.”235
Even deeper levels of failure are evident. Cases reveal one determinate
element of reasonable efforts—they entail efforts by the child protection agency,
not efforts by the state generally. This focus allows child protection agencies to
convince judges that they have made reasonable efforts even when the state as a
whole fails to provide interventions deemed essential to help families. For
instance, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed a finding that the agency made
reasonable efforts to reunify even when it failed to arrange for or offer specific
services the trial court deemed necessary.236 The court sympathized with the CPS
agency for being “at the mercy of [other] agencies” that lacked funding to
provide services to the parent, at least when the agency made a “good faith
attempt” to arrange services.237 Similar attitudes prevail in multiple states.238 This
approach permits a state as a whole to chronically underfund housing, mental
health care, child care, and more, and then use that underfunding as an excuse
for CPS agencies to avoid helping families.
This approach is evident in In re A.M., in which the state, through agencies
other than the CPS agency, refused to pay for services the family court and CPS
agency deemed essential, such as a mental health assessment. The impoverished

232. Sankaran & Church, supra note 137, at 227; see also ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.,
ADVISORY REPORT ON FRONT LINE AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICE 47 (2000) (observing that
reasonable efforts obligations are “very rarely addressed” in New York City family courts);
EDWARDS, supra note 165, at 102 (“Judges are often reluctant to make ‘no reasonable efforts’
findings.”).
233. Edwards, supra note 221.
234. Sankaran & Church, supra note 137, at 227-29.
235. Jerry Milner & David Kelly, Reasonable Efforts as Prevention, ABA CHILD L.
PRAC. TODAY (Nov. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/6ZMD-SKP3. From 2017-2021, Milner was
Associate Commissioner of the Children’s Bureau and Kelly was special assistant to the
associate commissioner, and a child welfare program specialist for the federal court
improvement program. Id.
236. In re Shirley B., 18 A.3d 40, 55 (Md. 2011).
237. Id. at 55-56.
238. See EDWARDS, supra note 165, at 65-66 (collecting sources, critiquing this practice,
and encouraging courts to “base any conclusion on what is reasonable, not what the agency
currently has at its disposal” and to “encourage the creation of new services”). But see In re
S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123, 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (“Under the reasonable efforts requirement,
agencies can be required to provide services that are normally the province of other
agencies.”).
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parent could not pay for them and the appellate court expressed no concern about
whether the agency had made reasonable efforts and instead held the parent
responsible for not being able to obtain these services. The Missouri family court
could have ordered the state to pay for these services for Ms. M.—but the
reasonable efforts standard as currently understood did not require it to do so.
The problem is deepened by exploring how CPS agencies spend money on
foster families, but not the families that the agencies separate. When CPS
agencies remove children from their parents and place them in foster care, they
offer monthly subsidies to foster parents to take care of those children. Those
monthly rates must “cover the cost of . . . food, clothing, shelter, daily
supervision, school supplies, a child’s personal incidentals, [and] liability
insurance with respect to a child.”239 This list features some high-cost items—
housing (“shelter”) and child care (“daily supervision”)240—and foster parent
subsidies are accordingly significantly larger than benefits offered directly to
parents. For instance, in Texas, foster families receive a minimum of $812 per
month, up to $2,773 per month depending on the needs of the child.241 When
Texas pays Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) benefits, it amounts to a
fraction of what it spends on foster children—closer to $100 per child rather than
$812 or more.242
While states pay these generous sums to support children’s needs after
separating them from their families, the indeterminate reasonable efforts
standard, as it is applied in the vast majority of courts, fails to require states to
pay comparable funds prior to family separations or to reunify families.
Inadequate housing is a frequent reason agencies separate children from their
parents and a frequent barrier to reunification,243 yet CPS agencies do not
generally provide comparable assistance to parents.244 Under the principle
discussed above, they do not have to—housing, for instance, is another agency’s
responsibility.245 So families are left to watch agencies pay significant sums of

239. 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(A).
240. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. &
FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL § 8.3(B)(3),
https://perma.cc/Z69P-FMW2 (providing that CPS agencies may incorporate child care costs
into foster care maintenance payments or pay child care providers directly).
241. 24-Residential Child Care Reimbursement Rates, TEX. DEP’T OF FAM. &
PROTECTIVE SERVS., https://perma.cc/5AE6-QJUV (archived Apr. 23, 2022). Monthly rates in
the text are calculated by multiplying daily rates listed by the Department by thirty.
242. The more children a family has, the worse the disparity gets; an extra child leads
to only $72 more per month in TANF benefits. TANF Cash Help, TEX. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://perma.cc/K8M3-CQJE (archived Apr. 23, 2022).
243. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
244. I have identified one court that has challenged this disparity in dicta in a decision
more than thirty years ago. See In re Nicole G., 577 A.2d 248, 250 (R.I. 1990) (“[G]iven the
cost of subsidizing foster care for multiple children, it seems likely that cash disbursements
for housing assistance will be more cost effective in the long run.”).
245. Judge Leonard Edwards, compiling reasonable efforts decisions nationally, reports
that most states lack any appellate case law on the question of when, if ever, reasonable efforts
include provision of housing assistance to parents. EDWARDS, supra note 165, at 45-46.
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money to separate them—including funds to support the housing costs of
strangers granting physical custody of their children—while the agencies are
excused from paying similar sums or housing assistance to prevent removals or
reunify.246
In re A.M. illustrates the bitter irony of the disparity between funds paid to
support children separated from their families and those paid to support them
with their families. Ms. M. needed assistance providing child care for her child
so she could work. The cost of such occasional child care, even overnight child
care,247 would likely be less than the cost of foster care maintenance payments,
coupled with other costs of foster care (including court costs, and the costs of
treating the emotional trauma caused the child by the separation). Indeed, the
state’s financial outlays in that case seem absurd—the state imposed the trauma
of a family separation on a young child and then paid hundreds of dollars a month
to support that child in foster care when for a similar cost it could have kept the
child safely with her mother and avoided that trauma.
These dynamics reflect more than the indeterminacy of the reasonable
efforts standard. They reflect a legal and policy structure that fails to support
children and families (especially those who are low-income) adequately and then
responds reactively, invasively, and often ineffectively when families have
difficulty raising their children.248 But it is the indeterminacy of the reasonable
efforts standard that has made child protection law’s nominal commitment to
making strong efforts to support families an all-too-often empty promise.
B. Consequences of Substantive Indeterminacy
In the absence of determinate substantive legal standards about when and
how to intervene in families, child protection agencies have wide discretion to
decide which cases they file and prosecute and agencies and courts have wide
246. Even in the relatively few courts that impose an obligation to assist families with
housing, courts note that “[t]he form of assistance may vary” and may include a range of
assistance that falls short of subsidizing housing. Wash. State Coal. for the Homeless v. Dep’t
of Soc. & Health Servs., 949 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wash. 1997); see also In re Nicole G., 577
A.2d at 250 (describing “stopgap” assistance in the form of a security deposit and “first few
months’ rent”); In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 649 (Del. 1986) (noting agency could have kept
parent—herself a minor—and her child in a foster home for six months rather than separate
mother and child).
Providing housing assistance to families who are subject to CPS agency interventions could
create a perverse incentive to trigger such interventions to obtain that assistance; broaderbased housing assistance would be the ideal solution. See Harvey et al., supra note 5, at 59395 (describing such incentives in reference to the Family Unification Program housing
assistance). Until such broader-based housing assistance is available, those perverse incentives
are preferrable to separating families due to housing difficulties.
247. Overnight childcare is quite possible. The Utah Supreme Court referenced it as a
means of helping both “children at risk of abuse or neglect, and . . . families in need.” In re
S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Other examples exist. E.g., Alfred Lubrano,
Montco Nonprofit Offers Free In-Home Overnight Child Care to Low-Income, Single
Mothers, PHILA. INQUIRER (updated Feb. 5, 2022), https://perma.cc/4JA9-GM6C.
248. E.g., Huntington, supra note 7, at 1489-97.
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discretion to determine which children to remove, what steps to demand of
families subject to court jurisdiction, and whether or when to reunify families.
Legislatures have effectively delegated these essential policy questions to
agencies and family courts to answer through individual cases. As Michael Wald
wrote in 1975, indeterminate legal standards “increase the likelihood that
decisions to intervene will be made in situations where the child will be harmed
by the intervention,” and ensures interventions will occur following subjective
decisions of individual case workers and judges, which implicit biases may
infect.249 The results of indeterminacy also include a national system which fails
to achieve its core goals and tremendous inconsistency in practice from one
jurisdiction to another.
1. Child Protection System Fails to Achieve Its Core Goals
Historic critiques of the child protection system remain strong. Robert
Mnookin argued that the legal system failed to consistently identify children that
needed the system’s intervention for their safety,250 and that criticism remains.251
The legal system continues to remove many children who could be better served
elsewhere.252 Measured by the legal system’s own decisions, it intervenes in
literally millions of families without taking any action to help children, providing
a coercive intervention in the lives of disproportionately poor, Black, and
Indigenous families without any concomitant benefit.253 Michael Wald recently
estimated that this describes 80% of all CPS agency investigations.254
Simultaneously, the legal system continues to miss much maltreatment which
occurs. The Fourth National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS4), released in 2010, highlighted the study’s consistent finding that children
identified as maltreated by CPS agencies “represent only the ‘tip of the
iceberg.’”255 Moreover, the child protection system fails to protect a relatively
steady number of children from death attributed to child neglect or abuse (though

249. Wald, supra note 69, at 1001-02.
250. Mnookin, supra note 69, at 268-72.
251. Huntington, supra note 72, at 221.
252. See generally Sankaran & Church, supra note 137 (describing how the current
legal system fails children who spend less than thirty days in foster care).
253. Each year, CPS agencies investigation allegations of maltreatment regarding about
3.5 million children. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 84, at 18. CPS agencies consider
a small minority of these children—about 650,000 every year—to actually be maltreated. Id.
at 20. And agencies place only a minority of these children in foster care each year. Id. at 90.
254. Michael S. Wald, Replacing CPS: Issues in Building an Alternative System, 12
COLUM. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author).
255. ANDREA J. SEDLAK, JANE METTENBURG, MONICA BASENA, IAN PETTA, KARLA
MCPHERSON, ANGELA GREENE & SPENCER LI, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN.
FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 2-2 (2010), https://perma.cc/727KMWEF.
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the number of such cases, less than 2,000 annually, represents a small fraction of
the millions of neglect and abuse allegations reported to CPS agencies).256
2. Inconsistency across jurisdictions and time
Substantive indeterminacy also permits remarkable inconsistency in child
protection practice across jurisdictions and time. Leading studies show only a
“weak relationship” between the severity of abuse and the likelihood that
authorities removed a child from an abusive family.257 Federal data shows wildly
different legal system actions in different states. Consider, for instance, the rate
by which state CPS agencies consider children to be neglect or abuse victims—
the rate is 6.4 times higher in New York than New Jersey, 7.0 times higher in
South Carolina than North Carolina, 6.2 times higher in Oregon than
Washington, 3.3 times higher in Illinois than Missouri, and 4.6 times higher in
Iowa than Missouri.258 Consider also the percentage of children deemed victims
who state agencies separate from their families and place in the foster system—
that figure ranges from 5.3 to 50.6%. It is 19.7% in North Dakota but 50.6% in
South Dakota; 16.8% in Vermont but 37.5% in New Hampshire; and 18.2% in
Texas but 35.6% in California.259 Rates of foster care placements and
terminations of the parent-child relationship also vary significantly from one
metro area to another; for instance, nearly 10% of all children in Maricopa
County, Arizona (Phoenix) will be placed in foster care at some time in their
childhoods, compared about 2% in Cook County, Illinois (Chicago).260 It strains
credulity to suggest that the rate of neglect or abuse, or the rate of severe
maltreatment necessitating foster care varies this substantially by jurisdiction.
And, even within states, where the same body of law applies, practice and
outcomes vary significantly from county to county.261

256. Child fatalities attributed to child maltreatment have ranged from 2.23 to 2.50 per
100,000 children over the past five years. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 84, at 54.
Those rates are relatively steady compared to the 1970s, suggesting a failure of the modern
child protection system—which expanded dramatically from the 1970s to the 1990s—to save
children’s lives. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 7, at 911. The data suggests that, if anything, child
fatality rates have increased, though that may reflect changes in data tracking rather than an
actual difference in fatalities. Id. at 911-12.
257. DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 146 (2d ed. 2004).
258. Federal publications report the number of child victims identified by each state
agency, per 1,000 children in that state. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 84, at 37. For
the states noted in the text the rates are: New York 16.7, New Jersey 2.6, South Carolina 16.8,
North Carolina 2.4, Oregon 15.6, Washington 2.5, Illinois 11.8, Missouri 3.5, and Iowa 16.0.
Id.
259. Id. at 90.
260. Frank Edwards, Sara Wakefield, Kieran Healy & Christopher Wildeman, Contact
with Child Protective Services is Pervasive But Unequally Distributed by Race and Ethnicity
in Large US Counties, 118 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S., no. 30, 2021, at 1, 3.
261. E.g., Patchwork Protection: Inconsistency and Inequity in Child Welfare Policies
Across North Carolina, CAROLINA PUB. PRESS (June 2021), https://perma.cc/XRX4-UDL5.

260

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 33:217

In re A.M. is again illustrative. The case began when the family lived in a
Missouri suburb of Kansas City, but after A.M.’s removal, Ms. M. relocated to
a Kansas suburb.262 There, Ms. M. raised another child with her fiancé, and
Kansas authorities were aware of concerns arising from the fiancé’s domestic
violence against Ms. M., but saw progress and no need to remove the younger
child.263 Missouri authorities, however, used the same facts to justify not only a
continued separation of A.M. and Ms. M., but the termination of their legal
relationship.264 No legal differences between the two states are apparent to
explain these drastically different interventions. Rather, differences in Kansas
and Missouri authorities’ application of indeterminate standards do so.
Rate of child maltreatment substantiations and removals also varies across
time, reflecting that child protection agency orientations rather than child
protection law shape outcomes. In twenty states, rates of substantiating
maltreatment changed more than 20% (up or down) from 2015 to 2019.265 Rates
of foster care placements have also changed dramatically over time within certain
states, declining from 21.6 per 1,000 children in Washington D.C. in 2004 to 5.2
in 2019, while increasing in West Virginia from 10 to 20.2.266 This phenomenon
in most dramatically visible in foster care panics, in which “a frenzied push
toward removal of children from their homes follow[s] the highly publicized
death of a child.”267 The short-term pressure to remove more children in response
to such tragedies, despite the harms of doing so,268 is intuitive. But the spikes
(and eventual drops) in agency interventions in families reflects substantive law
that is broad and vague enough to permit wide fluctuations in agency actions
from one point in time to another.
C. Unequal Application of Child Protection Law
The child protection system is not simply inconsistent across jurisdictions;
stark disparities exist based on which families the child protection system
intervenes. Racial disparities in the child protection system are well-established,
and a growing set of academic and activist work decry the present system as
fundamentally racist.269 While disparities between Black and White children are

262. Memorandum Supplementing Order Affirming Judgment, supra note 25, at 3.
263. Id. at 3, 11 n.6.
264. Id.
265. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019, supra note 84, at 37.
266. Anthony Bald, Joseph J. Dolye, Jr., Max Gross & Brian Jacob, Economics of Foster
Care 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 29906, 2022),
https://perma.cc/NM89-52YB.
267. Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding Over the Cracks: Predictive Analytics and Child
Protection, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 322 (2019).
268. Id. at 322-23; see also, e.g., Daniel Heimpel, In Aftermath of Latest Child Death,
L.A. Contends with Potential Foster Care Panic, IMPRINT (Aug. 13, 2019, 6:24 AM),
https://perma.cc/XS9H-STP6 (describing pressure for increased removals in one jurisdiction
and the phenomenon elsewhere).
269. E.g., ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 6, 9; Dettlaff et al., supra note 2, at 501-08;
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somewhat smaller than they used to be, Black children remain overrepresented
in foster care.270 Across childhoods, CPS agencies place 10-12% of Black
children and 11-15% of American Indian/Alaska Native children in foster care
for some period of time compared with only 5% of White children.271 Black
families are also disproportionately the subjects of more invasive actions at
multiple stages of child protection cases—compared to White families, Black
families are more frequently reported to CPS agencies, more frequently subject
to investigations, more frequently the subject of CPS agency-substantiated
allegations, more frequently removed, less frequently reunified, and more
frequently spend a longer time in foster care, and these disparities are consistent
across both time and jurisdictions.272 While some scholars have suggested Black
families have greater aggregate needs due to disproportionate poverty and
systemic racism, and that these needs explain their disproportionate presence in
foster care, other studies find racial disparities remain even when controlling for
family poverty and the level of risk CPS caseworkers believed to exist.273
Other overlapping demographic categories also lead to unequal odds of
one’s family becoming subject to the child protection system. CPS agencies and
family courts overwhelmingly intervene in low-income families.274 Nancy
Gwendoline M. Alphonso, Political-Economic Roots of Coercion—Slavery, Neoliberalism,
and the Racial Family Policy Logic of Child and Social Welfare, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 471,
474-77 (2021); Martin Guggenheim, How Racial Politics Led Directly to the Enactment of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997—The Worst Law Affecting Families Ever Enacted by
Congress, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 711, 713-16 (2021).
270. In 2020, Black children accounted for 15.3% of the under 18 population, but 25.1%
of children in foster care, creating a “disproportionality index”—”the level at which groups of
children are present in the child welfare system relative to their proportion in the general
population” of 1.65. Disproportionality Rates for Children of Color in Foster Care Dashboard
(2010-2020), NAT’L COUNCIL JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES (2022), https://perma.cc/8XB2-NFW3.
Disparities are even larger for indigenous children, who are represented in foster care at 2.68
times their proportion of the general population. Id.
271. Christopher Wildeman & Natalia Emanuel, Cumulative Risks of Foster Placement
by Age 18 for U.S. Children, 2000-2011, PLOS ONE, Mar. 2014, at 1, 5.
272. Dettlaff et al., supra note 2, at 501-02. The disparities are vividly illustrated in
graphs showing the cumulative likelihood in twenty large metropolitan counties of CPS
agencies determining a child was neglected or abused, placing a child in foster care, or
terminating a parent-child relationship. Black children had the “highest cumulative risk of
each of these events across all counties.” Edwards et al., supra note 260, at 2; see also id. at 3
(displaying racial disparities data graphically).
273. See, e.g., Alan J. Dettlaff, Reiko Boyd, Darcey Merritt, Jason Anthony Plummer
& James D. Simon, Racial Bias, Poverty, and the Notion of Evidence, 99 CHILD WELFARE,
no. 3, 2021, at 61, 63-67, 73 (collecting and discussing studies); Dettlaff et al., supra note 2,
at 505-06 (collecting and discussing studies); Stephanie L. Rivaux, Joyce James, Kim
Wittenstrom, Donald Baumann, Janess Sheets, Judith Henry & Victoria Jeffries, The
Intersection of Race, Poverty, and Risk: Understanding the Decision to Provide Services to
Clients and to Remove Children, 87 CHILD WELFARE no. 2, 2008, at 151, 161-63 (controlling
for income and risk assessments, finding CPS agency more likely to separate Black families);
see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, TORN APART: HOW THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM DESTROYS
BLACK FAMILIES—AND HOW ABOLITION CAN BUILD A SAFER WORLD 36-46 (2022)
(responding to arguments attempting to justify racial disparities).
274. See, e.g., Kelley Fong, Child Welfare Involvement and Contexts of Poverty: The
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Polikoff has summarized the research showing a likelihood that families headed
by LGBTQ parents face disproportionate levels of intervention by CPS
agencies.275 Precise statistics are hard to come by because few studies track the
sexual orientation of parents,276 but one study found that Black LGBTQ parents
were four times as likely as heterosexual Black parents to lose custody of their
children.277 Disparate outcomes for children of parents with disabilities are also
well established; 19% of all foster children have parents with disabilities, well
above the percentage for all children.278 Immigrant families have long been
subject to particular focus for child protection system intervention.279
Crucially, the vague standards discussed in Part II.A create opportunities for
various actors’ implicit biases to create or exacerbate these long-standing
disparities.280 The breadth and vagueness of neglect definitions, for instance, lead
to “highly subjective” decisionmaking.281 Vague child protection laws put into
practice are “particularly vulnerable to biased decisionmaking that frequently
increases the risk of error and secondary harm to these already disenfranchised
families.”282 As the Washington Supreme Court observed in 2022, these vague
standards are particularly “susceptible to class-and race-based biases.”283
The likelihood of implicit biases infecting discretionary decisionmaking is
particularly apparent upon an examination of how agencies and courts make
decisions in crowded neglect and abuse dockets. Leah Hill has documented how,
in crowded urban family courts, “[i]mpatience seem[s] the order of the day,”
Role of Parental Adversities, Social Networks, and Social Services, 72 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 5, 5-6, 8 (2017) (noting and analyzing well established “link between poverty and
child welfare involvement”).
275. Nancy D. Polikoff, Neglected Lesbian Mothers, FAM. L.Q., Spring 2018, at 87, 9196.
276. See id. at 90.
277. Kathi L.H. Harp & Carrie B. Oser, Factors Associated with Two Types of Child
Custody Loss Among a Sample of African American Mothers: A Novel Approach, SOC. SCI.
RSCH., Nov. 2016, at 283, 291.
278. Elizabeth Lightfoot & Sharyn DeZelar, The Experiences and Outcomes of Children
in Foster Care Who Were Removed Because of a Parental Disability, 62 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 22, 22-23 (2016).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
280. This critique is common in regards to the family court standards. See, e.g., Anne
L. Alstott, Anne C. Dailey & Douglas NeJaime, Psychological Parenthood, 106 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 2-3) (on file with author) (“[T]he vague best interests
standard has allowed prejudice and bias—based on race, class, gender, marital status, sexual
orientation, gender identity, religion, and disability—to influence decision-making processes
in ways that undervalue children’s relationships with their close parental caregivers.”).
281. Henry & Lens, supra note 86, at 24.
282. Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National Debate,
97 MARQ. L. REV. 215, 222 (2013); see also Amy Mulzer & Tara Urs, However Kindly
Intentioned: Structural Racism and Volunteer CASA Programs, 20 CUNY L. REV. 23, 29-30
(2016); Vivek Sankaran, With Child Welfare, Racism Is Hiding in the Discretion, IMPRINT
(June 21, 2020, 11:00 PM), https://perma.cc/7TAR-SRQV (“Discretion is the rule. And when
such wide discretion exists, we know that both implicit and explicit bias can significantly
affect the decisions that are made.”).
283. In re K.W., 504 P.3d 207, 219 (Wash. 2022).
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leading to quick hearings and decisions in tension with standard notions of due
process.284 High caseloads lead to routine practices which can reflect “a very real
value judgment about litigants” who populate family court dockets without
taking sufficient time to deliberate about the evidentiary support for such
judgments.285 Even when authorities make decisions slowly and carefully, they
make those decisions in a context in which a range of professionals with similar
training and more power than the families at issue.286 That cohesiveness among
many of the professionals involved, coupled with vague substantive standards,
insulation from public oversight via confidentiality,287 and the “provocative
situational context” of seeking to protect children all contributes to group-think
among this professional group.288 It should be no surprise that decisions made in
this institutional context under substantively vague standards lead to the
disparities at issue in America’s child protection system.
III. CURRENT REFORM LANDSCAPE
Calls for reforming or abolishing the present child protection legal system
abound. The trend—supported by federal reforms, scholars, advocates, and the
burgeoning family defense movement—is to seek to limit CPS agencies’
intervention in family life, and especially to limit family separations. This trend
finds support in a range of social science evidence documenting the harms caused
by separating children from parents, and the relatively worse outcomes of doing
so compared with keeping families together.289
284. Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the New
York City Family Court—the Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 527, 529 (2007).
285. Id. at 541. Hill discussed a discrete issue—when family courts would appoint a
CPS agency to investigate families in private custody cases—but her point applies more
broadly.
286. Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the
Institutional Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink
Theory, 34 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 55, 70 (2010).
287. For a critique of confidentiality laws in CPS cases, see generally Matthew I.
Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child
Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1 (2010).
288. Breger, supra note 286, at 78.
289. A full exploration of these findings is beyond the scope of this Article. Others have
collected studies documenting the harms of family separations. E.g., Vivek Sankaran,
Christopher Church & Monique Mitchell, A Cure Worse than the Disease? The Impact of
Removal on Children and Their Families, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1161, 1165-69 (2019); Shanta
Trevedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523, 527-52 (2019).
When these harms outweigh the harms of leaving children in their families remains a subject
of empirical debate. One study found that children placed in foster care for any length of time
were three times more likely to be arrested, convicted, and imprisoned as adults than were
similarly at-risk children left with their parents. Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and
Adult Crime: Using Investigator Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of Foster Care, 116
J. POL. ECON. 746, 748 (2008); see also Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child
Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583, 1607 (2007)
(suggesting that children placed in foster care may have had higher delinquency rates, higher
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These calls have focused on a variety of goals. Many seek a stronger safety
net for families, including, for instance, more housing supports.290 Scholars have
contributed to these calls by studying the connection between anti-poverty
policies and the scope of the child protection system, finding, for instance, that
increased earned income tax credits, fighting evictions, a higher minimum wage,
and expanded health care access can all reduce the number of allegations of child
maltreatment made to CPS agencies.291 Other reforms seek to make incremental
changes in state legislative schemes. Federal funding laws were reformed in
2018, seeking to change how state agencies behave without changing the legal
standards that govern them in family court proceedings.292
This section will outline these reform efforts. Most importantly, this outline
will show that none of the reform efforts thus far fully address the substantive
indeterminacy at the core of child neglect and abuse proceedings. Finally, this
section will contrast existing reforms with analogous reform trends in the
juvenile justice system—which go further in imposing substantive determinacy
throughout the life of delinquency cases. Such detailed and determinate reforms,
tying specific types of conduct by parent to specific interventions by the state, is
called for in the child neglect and abuse system.
A. Incremental Statutory Reform
A small set of state legislative changes use more determinate substantive
rules to narrow the scope of the child protection legal system, albeit
incrementally. Advocates have also begun seeking more dramatic legislative
reforms that would similarly limit CPS agencies’ and family courts’
interventions in family life.
teen birth rates, and lower earnings than did similarly at-risk children left with their parents).
Another study using a similar methodology in a different jurisdiction reached opposite
conclusions. Max Gross & E. Jason Baron, Temporary Stays and Persistent Gains: The Causal
Effects of Foster Care, 14 APPLIED ECON., Apr. 2022, at 170, 170-71. A recent paper, including
authors of those two studies reaching competing conclusions, summarized the unclear state of
the research. Bald et al., supra note 266, at 5-7.
290. E.g., Dettlaff et al., supra note 2, at 511.
291. Nicole L. Kovski, Heather D. Hill, Stephen J. Mooney, Frederick P. Rivara, Erin
R. Morgan & Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Association of State-Level Earned Income Tax Credits
With Rates of Reported Child Maltreatment, 2004-2017, 27 CHILD MALTREATMENT
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 7), https://perma.cc/V3JY-YS8J; Lindsey Rose Bullinger
& Kelley Fong, Evictions and Neighborhood Child Maltreatment Reports, 31 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 490, 500, 505-09 (2021); Emily C.B. Brown, Michelle M. Garrison, Hao Bao,
Pingping Qu, Carole Jenny & Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Assessment of Rates of Child
Maltreatment in States with Medicaid Expansion vs States Without Medicaid Expansion,
JAMA NETWORK OPEN, June 2019, at 1, 6-8; Kerri M. Raissian & Lindsey Rose Bullinger,
Money Matters: Does the Minimum Wage Affect Child Maltreatment Rates?, 72 CHILD. &
YOUTH SERVS. REV. 60, 65-66 (2017). Despite the titles of some of these studies, e.g., Brown
et al., these studies do not measure actual child maltreatment. Rather, they study the rate of
reported suspicions of child maltreatment and thus the perceptions of possible maltreatment,
especially by mandatory reporters who make the majority of such reports.
292. See infra Part III.B.
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First, several states have begun to narrow the definitions of neglect. In 2021,
Texas enacted the furthest reaching statute, defining neglect to require a parent
to show “blatant disregard for the consequences of [an] act or failure to act that
results in harm to the child or that creates an immediate danger to the child’s
physical health or safety.”293 Requiring a “blatant disregard” for the
consequences of an act could narrow the definition’s scope. A.M.’s mother may
have left A.M. home alone, but she did so in order to work and due to a lack of
child care and she would thus at least have an argument that this conduct did not
show a “blatant disregard” for her daughter. Requiring an existing harm or an
“imminent” risk of harm could also narrow the scope of neglect, as the
imminence requirement is typically reserved for emergency removals, not
defining neglect.
States have also narrowed the definition of neglect in at least two discrete
fact patterns. Starting in 2018, several states have adopted legislation intended to
protect families from child protection intervention when parents permit children
to engage in “independent activity”—colloquially known as “free-range
parenting.”294 These statutes followed several high-profile cases which
demonstrated how broad existing neglect definitions could be stretched. In North
Augusta, South Carolina, Debra Harrell let her 9-year-old play in park while she
worked at a McDonald’s. The park was well-populated and the child had a cell
phone in case of emergency, but Ms. Harrell was arrested and her child placed
in foster care for almost three weeks.295 In Silver Spring, Maryland, Danielle and
Alexander Meitiv were accused of neglecting their 10- and 6-year-old children
whom they permitted to walk home from a park alone. The CPS agency
determined they had not neglected their children, but only after they successfully
appealed a neglect finding from one incident and, after a second incident several
months later, police held the children for five hours and the agency investigated
the family for two months.296 Similar cases have been documented elsewhere,297
and legislators have publicly noted how their families faced intervention when
they permitted their children to play unsupervised.298 Several fact patterns
293. H.B. 567, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Tex. 2021); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 261.001(4) (West 2021).
294. E.g., Donna De La Cruz, Utah Passes ‘Free-Range’ Parenting Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/GM6S-2RE8.
295. Diana Reese, South Carolina Mom Who Left Daughter at Park Sues TV Station,
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/J2KT-CZ4W. The charges were eventually
dropped. Eva Moore, SC Senator Tests Waters with ‘Free Range Parenting’ Bill, FREE TIMES
(Columbia, S.C.) (updated May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q86G-S8EJ.
296. Donna St. George, ‘Free Range’ Parents Cleared in Second Neglect Case After
Kids Walked Alone, WASH. POST (June 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/RF6H-3KCB.
297. E.g., Kari Anne Roy, How Letting My Kid Play Alone Outside Led to a CPS
Investigation, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 25, 2014, 5:22 PM CDT), https://perma.cc/AA242HX2 ; KHOU Staff, Mom Charged with Abandonment Said Kids Were Never Out of Sight,
KHOU*11 (July 17, 2015, 11:00 PM CDT), https://perma.cc/QUB3-5BZM.
298. Let Grow Staff, Two States Pass “Childhood Independence” Laws That Ensure It
Is Not Neglect for Kids to Play Outside, LET GROW, https://perma.cc/6Z69-PQCJ (archived
Apr. 23, 2022) (noting Nevada Assemblywoman Alexis Hansen’s eight and ten year old
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evoked calls for racial and class justice—parents without easy or affordable child
care options, including parents of color, leaving children in a park while they
worked299 or within eyesight in a mall food court while they interviewed for a
job.300
A growing state legislative trend seeks to narrow neglect definitions to
exclude these situations from the definitions of neglect. Utah enacted the first
“independent activity” bill in 2018, excluding from the definition of neglect a
parent who permits a child “of sufficient age and maturity to avoid harm or
unreasonable risk of harm, to engage in independent activities.”301 Lawmakers
expressed concern that neglect statutes were broad enough to encompass a child
playing in a park alone.302 Texas and Oklahoma followed suit in 2021 and
Colorado followed suit in 2022,303 with legislation pending in other states.304
Other states have narrowed the definition of neglect as it relates to marijuana
usage, consistent with trends towards marijuana legalization.305 In 2021, New
York amended its marijuana laws to provide that marijuana use does not amount
to neglect “without a separate finding that the child’s physical, mental or
emotional condition was impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired.”306 Texas similarly enacted legislation prohibiting its CPS agency from
removing children based solely on a parent’s marijuana use “unless the
department has evidence that the parent’s use of marihuana has caused
significant impairment to the child’s physical or mental health or emotional
development.”307 Still, most states that have legalized marijuana have not

grandchildren were the subjects of a 911 call when permitted to play outside alone).
299. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
300. KHOU Staff, supra note 297.
301. S.B. 65, 62d Leg., General Sess. § 3 (Utah 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 80-1-102
(51)(b)(iv) (West 2022).
302. De La Cruz, supra note 294.
303. H.B. 567, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3, 5, 6 (Tex. 2021); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 161.001(c)(6), 261.001(4)(B)(ii), 262.116(a)(6) (West 2021); H.B. 2565, 2021 Reg. Sess.
§ 1 (Okla. 2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(49)(b) (2021); H.B. 22-1090, 73d Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Colo. 2022) (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(100)).
304. E.g., S. 288, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2022); S.B. 143, 81st Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Nev. 2021).
305. One study concludes that marijuana legalization leads to at least a 10% reduction
in children separated from their families and placed in foster care. John Gardner & Bright
Osei, Recreational Marijuana Legalization and Admission to the Foster-Care System, 60
ECON. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3, 20), https://perma.cc/RYL6-KTRX . The
authors attribute that reduction both to the direct effect of legal changes—authorities no longer
viewing parental marijuana use as neglect—and to behavioral changes such as parents
substituting marijuana use for alcohol and harder drugs and thereby reducing maltreatment.
Id. at 3, 12.
306. S. 854A, 2021-2022 Reg. Sess. § 58 (N.Y. 2021); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(iii)
(McKinney 2021).
307. H.B. 567, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Tex. 2021); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 262.116(a)(7) (West 2021).
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included such explicit statutory language prohibiting CPS agencies or family
courts from considering marijuana use alone to be neglect.308
Second, Washington State enacted the “Keeping Families Together Act” in
2021,309 tightening limits on removals. Following Mnookin’s call for somewhat
more determinate standards for removing children, the Washington legislature
required probable cause that a child would face an “imminent physical harm”
and “would be seriously injured” but for a removal.310 Moreover, that imminent
harm must “outweigh[] the harm the child will experience as a result of
removal.”311 The legislature stated its intent was “to safely reduce the number of
children in foster care and reduce racial bias in the system by applying a standard
criteria for determining whether to remove a child”312—explicitly seeking to
respond to the criticisms outlined in Part II.
Third, New York has enacted reforms to limit the likelihood that its child
neglect and abuse registry would harm low-income parents’ ability to find
employment without protecting children from abuse or neglect. New York law
now requires hearing officers in administrative appeals of registry placements to
determine if the maltreatment is “relevant and reasonably related” to the
registry’s protective purposes.313
Fourth, Washington State enacted reforms making terminations of parentchild relationships somewhat more difficult in 2022. The new statute requires the
CPS agency to discuss guardianship as an option whenever a child has lived with
a foster family for six months, prohibits moving children out of kinship
placements because kin do not want to adopt the child (and thus terminate the
parent-child relationship), and requires consideration of guardianship as an
option when a court considers a termination petition.314
Reform advocates have articulated a range of other specific proposals. They
include repealing the Adoption and Safe Families Act, especially its 15-of-22month rule.315 Other discrete proposals include: strengthening the reasonable
308. See Megan Conn, As New York Legalizes Marijuana, Parent Advocates Push Child
Welfare Agencies to Adapt, IMPRINT (May 11, 2021, 4:54 AM), https://perma.cc/H5Z2-CJVE
(describing New York’s statute as “[u]nlike most states that previously enacted [marijuana
legalization] laws” in that it explicitly “challenges the assumption that [marijuana use] is, by
itself, evidence of irresponsible parenting,” while other states legalized marijuana but have not
changed child neglect definitions to account for the drug’s legal status).
309. H.B. 1227, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Wash. 2021).
310. Id. at §§ 4-5, Keeping Families Together Act, ch. 211, 2021 Wash. Laws. 1420 (to
be codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.44.056(1), 26.44.050); see also id. at § 6 (to be codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.050(1)(b)) (requiring a court to find “that removal is necessary
to prevent imminent physical harm” before ordering a removal).
311. Id. at § 9 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.065(5)(a)(ii)(B)(III)).
312. Id. at § 2.
313. S. 7506-B, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. Part R § 1 (N.Y. 2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 424-a(e)(viii) (McKinney 2022).
314. H.B. 1747, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1-2 (Wash. 2022); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 13.34.145(7)(b), 13.34.180(1)(f) (2022).
315. E.g., REPEAL ASFA, https://perma.cc/XC9P-5T3L (archived Apr. 23, 2022);
DETTLAFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 9; Richard Wexler, We Don’t Need the Adoption and Safe
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efforts requirement by changing it to “active efforts,” the more demanding phrase
required for Indian children in the Indian Child Welfare Act;316 requiring CPS
agencies to give a child protection-specific version of Miranda warnings to
families during their investigation; and permitting judges to adjourn cases in
contemplation of dismissal—a less invasive step when cases do proceed to
court.317
B. Federal Funding Reform
Congress enacted federal funding reforms with the goal of keeping families
together and preventing unnecessary family separations through the Family First
Prevention Services Act.318 The Act seeks to achieve these goals not through
changing any of the minimum federal requirements for handling individual cases
in state family courts, but by permitting state agencies to access federal funds to
work with “candidates for foster care.”319 However laudable its goals, the Act
seeks to achieve them through a mechanism that cements CPS agencies’ roles in
intervening in families. The Act’s funding for prevention services is only
accessible once a family is referred to CPS agencies and deemed a candidate for
foster care.320 Moreover, Family First makes no changes to the substantive
standards which govern state action to separate families—the definition of
neglect, removal requirements, and actions to take after removal. All of the other
topics discussed in Part II.A are no more determinate after Family First than they
were before.
Families Act to Shorten Foster Care Stays, IMPRINT (Apr. 30, 2021, 9:04 AM),
https://perma.cc/9F4C-RAW2; Kathleen Creamer & Chris Gottlieb, If Adoption and Safe
Families Act Can’t Be Repealed, Here’s How to At Least Make It Better, IMPRINT (Feb. 9,
2021, 7:00 PM), https://perma.cc/PJ26-M738; Shanta Trivedi, Adoption and Safe Families Act
Is the ‘Crime Bill’ of Child Welfare, IMPRINT (Jan. 28, 2021, 6:44 PM),
https://perma.cc/YHZ7-ZVBW. These recent calls echo lonelier calls from earlier years. See,
e.g., Victoria Copeland, Centering Unacknowledged Histories: Revisiting NABSW Demands
to Repeal ASFA, 16 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 1, 1-6 (2022) (describing National Association of
Black Social Workers’ 2003 call to repeal ASFA). A new publication, the Family Integrity &
Justice Quarterly, devoted its inaugural issue to “The Harm of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act.” FAM. INTEGRITY & JUST. Q., Winter 2022, https://perma.cc/33RU-DT9Q.
316. Dettlaff et al., supra note 2, at 512-13; WHITE ET AL., supra note 86, at 27-28.
317. Marco Poggio, NY Public Defenders Ask Leaders To Protect Parental Rights,
LAW360 (Feb 19, 2021, 4:46 PM EST), https://perma.cc/NNZ3-MMMR.
318. Family First Prevention Services Act, Pub. L. No. 115-123, div. E, tit. VII, 132
Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, NO. ACYF-CBPI-18-09, STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTING TITLE IV-E PREVENTION AND FAMILY SERVICES
AND PROGRAMS 2 (2018) (stating a goal of preventing “the trauma of unnecessary parent-child
separation”).
319. 42 U.S.C. § 671(e).
320. DETTLAFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 21-22; see also Miriam Mack, The White
Supremacy Hydra: How the Family First Prevention Services Act Reifies Pathology, Control,
and Punishment in the Family Regulation System, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 767, 797-804
(2021) (explaining how the Family First Act perpetuates CPS agencies’ role in surveilling and
regulating families).
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C. Legal Representation
Perhaps the most important reform in child protection law and practice is the
increase in quality legal representation for parents and, secondarily, for children.
Vigorous family defense offices have become important fixtures in many
jurisdictions’ child protection systems, with research demonstrating that they
help limit children’s time in foster care without creating safety harms for
children.321 Several states have also strengthened children’s right to legal
representation.322 And the federal government has made funding available for
parents’ and children’s legal representation.323 The importance of these
developments is difficult to overstate. Any functioning legal system needs
vigorous advocacy for all parties to ensure decisions are fully informed and as
accurate as possible,324 and to enforce individuals’ substantive and procedural
rights.325
Nonetheless, even the strongest advocates are limited by the laws under
which they advocate. Consider In re A.M. It is possible that particularly strong
advocacy for the parent326—challenging the grounds for intervention, and
breadth of the case plan, and seeking reunification sooner—could have led to an
outcome that did not destroy the family at issue. But under existing law, the
courts could have reached the same conclusion. As essential as improved legal
representation is, it does not erase the problems of substantive indeterminacy.

321. Lucas A. Gerber, Yuk C. Pang, Timothy Ross, Martin Guggenheim, Peter J. Pecora
& Joel Miller, Effects of an Interdisciplinary Approach to Parental Representation in Child
Welfare, 102 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 42, 52 (2019); Mark E. Courtney & Jennifer L.
Hook, Evaluation of the Impact of Enhanced Parental Legal Representation on the Timing of
Permanency Outcomes for Children in Foster Care, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1337,
1340-43 (2012).
322. The National Association of Counsel for Children has documented these changes
on its “Right to Counsel Campaign” website. E.g., Press Release, Nat’l Assoc. of Couns. for
Child., Victories for Children’s Right to Counsel Surge Across the Country: NACC Looks to
Continue Momentum Across States (May 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/7SMN-LMGE.
323. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S
BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL
§ 8.1B Question 30 (2019),
https://perma.cc/9USG-X2CH.
324. For a federal endorsement of this point, see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, CHILD.’S BUREAU, NO. ACYF-CB-IM-17-02, HIGH QUALITY
LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ALL PARTIES IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS 1 (2017),
https://perma.cc/F66V-9WVE (emphasizing “the importance of high quality legal
representation in helping ensure a well-functioning child welfare system”).
325. Vivek Sankaran makes this point plainly in his comment to this Article,
emphasizing that strong family defenders are needed to enforce any more determinate legal
standards that legislatures enact. Vivek Sankaran, Commentary, Without Effective Lawyers,
Do More Determinate Legal Standards Really Matter?, 33 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE
(forthcoming 2022).
326. I do not opine on the quality of representation in the actual case, as the available
public record includes only the appellate court decision and media summaries, not information
about trial court level advocacy.
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D. Abolition
Some advocates and academics have called for abolition of the present child
protection system,327 and the child protection system fits well within existing
frameworks for abolition of certain legal systems. Dorothy Roberts defines
abolitionist projects as those targeting systems which “can be traced back to
slavery and the racial capitalist regime it relied on and sustained.”328 Second, the
“system functions to oppress black people and other politically marginalized
groups.”329 Third, abolitionist projects “imagine and build a more humane and
democratic society that no longer relies on caging people to meet human needs
and solve social problems.”330 The present child protection legal system’s roots
in slavery are well-established by Roberts and others,331 as are the continued
harms it imposes on the disproportionately Black, Indigenous, and poor families
the system impacts. Applied to the child protection law and legal systems, an
abolitionist approach must “imagine and build” a legal system “that no longer
relies” on widespread surveillance, foster care, and termination of parent-child
relationships.
Abolition, however, does not necessarily mean that the state would never
separate children from their parents. Abolitionists tend to discuss such
separations as appropriate only in quite narrow circumstances, especially those
involving sexual abuse or severe physical abuse.332 Imposing clear substantive
standards on when the child protection and family court system can intervene,
and what shape that intervention takes, is essential to keeping those legal systems
limited to the most severe cases.333
E. Analogous Reforms in Juvenile Justice Are Further Developed
Analogous indeterminacy has marked a close relative of child neglect and
abuse law—juvenile delinquency law. Delinquency and child neglect and abuse
jurisdiction have the same historic roots; the first juvenile court was created to
327. See sources cited supra note 2.
328. Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (2019).
329. Id. at 7.
330. Id. at 7-8. Kristen Weber’s comment to this Article similarly seeks “to imagin[e]
and build[] the world we want to live in.” Kristen Weber, Commentary, Transforming
Requires Ending the Carceral Logic of the Child Welfare System, 33 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
ONLINE (forthcoming 2022).
331. E.g., Alphonso, supra note 269, at 474-77.
332. Wald, supra note 254, at 2 (acknowledging “some level of coercive intervention,
including placement in foster care, will remain necessary in some situations,” even if those
situations represent the minority of current cases).
333. Indeed, some abolitionist conversations involve specific reform proposals for
within family court cases. See Ashley Albert & Amy Mulzer, Adoption Cannot Be Reformed,
12 COLUM. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2022) (seeking to end adoption and preference
guardianship); Shanta Trevedi & Matthew Fraidin, A Role for Communities in Reasonable
Efforts to Prevent Removal, 12 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 16-17 (2022) (primary prevention as
part of reasonable efforts).
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handle both categories of cases.334 And, as in child neglect and abuse cases, in
delinquency cases, “juvenile courts imposed indeterminate nonproportional
dispositions.”335 As in child neglect and abuse cases, any disposition was
available for any adjudication. A child could be released after being convicted of
murder or incarcerated after being convicted of disorderly conduct.336
However, juvenile delinquency law has several notable features which child
protection law lacks, which both underscore the substantive indeterminacy at the
core of child protection law and may point the way towards legal changes to
reduce that indeterminacy. First is that delinquency uses the criminal code to
define when delinquency courts obtain jurisdiction, providing a more precise
legal formulation of what can justify state intervention in families.337
Second, the trend in delinquency law is to use the criminal code’s specificity
to create more determinate maximum consequences for particular offenses. In a
growing list of states, whether a court may incarcerate a child, for how long a
state may incarcerate a child, for how long a child may be placed on probation,
and even whether the state may prosecute (rather than divert) a child is
increasingly spelled out in juvenile delinquency codes, tied to the specific
conduct that has been adjudicated or charged.338
Third, juvenile justice reformers have used the specific list of criminal
charges available to authorities to target specific provisions that do not need to
exist. In the aftermath of a highly-publicized incident of excessive force by a
police officer seeking to arrest a child for the crime of “disturbing schools,” the
South Carolina legislature dramatically narrowed the definition of that offense.339
In light of evidence regarding extreme racial disparities in enforcement of public
disorderly conduct in public schools, one U.S. district court enjoined such
enforcement.340 In both instances, advocates and policymakers can use the
334. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 133 § 7, reprinted in JUV. &
FAM. CT. J., Fall 1998, at 1, 2.
335. BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND
THE CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 136 (2017).
336. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond “Children Are Different”: The Revolution in Juvenile
Intake and Sentencing, 96 WASH. L. REV. 425, 433-38 (2021).
337. See supra Part III.E. Notably, the one area where juvenile justice law goes beyond
the criminal code has led to the most sustained criticism: juvenile justice law encompasses
“status offenses,” law violations that are only violations when committed by a child. These
violations, such as “incorrigibility,” are vaguely defined, potentially leading to excessively
broad grounds for state intervention. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-20(9) (2021). That
indeterminacy, and the harms it has led to in practice, has inspired multiple generations of
criticism, and federal funding legislation limiting when status offenses can lead to the most
invasive forms of state intervention. Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83
YALE L.J. 1383, 1402-05 (1974); 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(23)(C)(iii)(I)-(II).
338. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 336, at 469-80.
339. S. 131, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420
(2021). For the background to this reform, see generally Josh Gupta-Kagan, The School-toPrison Pipeline’s Legal Architecture: Lessons from the Spring Valley Incident and Its
Aftermath, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83 (2017).
340. Kenny v. Wilson, No. 16-cv-2794, 2021 WL 4711450, at *18 (D.S.C. Oct. 8,
2021). The case is on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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specific offenses of the criminal code to debate and decide whether enforcing
some offenses runs counter to public policy.
These reforms have been used to limit the scope of the juvenile delinquency
system and especially its ability to incarcerate children. These reforms impose
statutory maxima—rather than mandatory minimum consequences—and
presumptions against certain more invasive steps (like prosecution rather than
diversion or incarceration) based on the offense at issue.341 The next section will
outline how analogous reforms in the child protection system can more
specifically define the conduct that system can address, and limit the
interventions which follow based on the underlying form of child maltreatment.
IV. LEGAL REFORM TO CONFRONT INDETERMINACY AND BIAS
This Part will outline ideas for legislative reforms for child neglect and abuse
cases in state family courts. These ideas will seek to identify a more determinate
set of substantive standards throughout the life of a family court case that would
limit CPS agency and court discretion and focus agency and family court
intervention on the relatively small number of cases which require that
intervention for children’s safety. These limits are also intended to limit space
for agency or court biases to lead to disparate treatment by the race, sex,
immigration status, disability, or sexual orientation of the parents or children
involved in cases. This Part builds on earlier proposed reforms such as Robert
Mnookin’s call for removals only when children face the imminent risk of some
significant harm and removal is necessary to mitigate that risk adequately,342 and
Michael Wald’s call for neglect to be defined more narrowly through a focus on
the harm caused by different actions,343 as well as the more recent set of reforms
discussed in Part III. In particular, it builds on juvenile justice reforms discussed
in Part III.E which identify maximum interventions based on the type and
severity of the delinquent act at issue.
The ideas in this Part seek to impose determinate substantive standards on
all of the essential stages of a case discussed in Part II.A. A central aspect of this
effort is to impose limits on permissible state intervention based on the specific
type of neglect or abuse at issue. The proposals in this Part seek to ensure the
underlying grounds for state intervention are precisely defined, and the type and
scope of interventions which follow are directly related to the type of neglect or
abuse adjudicated. This Part also proposes methods to address the range of
problems discussed in Part I.A, including the absence of kinship placement
hierarchies, and the weakness of existing understandings of the reasonable
efforts requirements.
Several categories of reforms are beyond the scope of this Article. First,
limiting CPS agencies’ surveillance and regulation of families outside of family

341. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 336, at 469-80.
342. See supra text accompanying note 133.
343. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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court cases is the topic of a wide body of research beyond this Article’s scope.344
Second, this Article will not address the essential role of high quality legal
representation for all parties, especially parents, in achieving good outcomes.345
This Article focuses on the substantive legal standards that such representation
can enforce, and suggests that stronger and clearer standards can lead to even
more positive impacts from vigorous representation.
A. Defining Neglect and Abuse
Calls for narrowing definitions of neglect and abuse are not new, but the best
way to do so remains unclear. In the 1970s, Michael Wald recommended
defining neglect more narrowly based on the specific harms caused by parental
conduct, and balancing those harms with the harm of state intervention in the
family.346 The American Bar Association and Institute of Judicial Administration
(on which Wald served as reporter) similarly recommended limiting CPS system
intervention to situations causing or likely causing “serious harm” to children.347
Wald and the ABA/IJA’s proposals, however, did not specifically define
prohibited conduct—intervention was warranted when a child faced a substantial
risk of imminent “serious physical injury as a result of conditions created by
his/her parents or by the failure of the parents to adequately supervise or protect
him/her.”348 The “conditions created” phrase is no more specific than existing
neglect definitions, and the work done in these standards to narrow the scope of
the child protection system rests on the elevated harm requirement. Nor did the
ABA/IJA propose the creation of different levels of neglect or abuse.
This Article endorses narrowing the definition of neglect by level of harm
and proposes going further. State legislatures should adopt civil child neglect and
abuse codes comparable in their detail to state criminal code and which create
344. For instance, a selection of such scholarship was featured at Columbia Law
School’s recent Strengthened Bonds symposium. E.g., Charlotte Baughman, Tehra Coles,
Jennifer Feinberg & Hope Newton, The Surveillance Tentacles of the Child Welfare System,
11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 501 (2021); Harvey et al., supra note 5; Angela Olivia Burton &
Angeline Montauban, Toward Community Control of Child Welfare Funding: Repeal the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and Delink Child Protection from Family WellBeing, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 639 (2021); Michael S. Wald, Beyond CPS: Building a New
System to Protect and Promote the Safety and Development of Children, 12 COLUM. J. RACE
& L. (forthcoming 2022); Caitlyn Garcia & Cynthia Godsoe, Divest, Invest, and Mutual Aid,
12 COLUM. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2022).
345. See supra Part III.C.
346. Wald, supra note 69, at 1005.
347. The ABA and IJA repeatedly used the phrases “serious harm” and “severe harm”
throughout its proposed standards. See INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASSOC., supra
note 88, at 4 (“In general, coercive intervention is limited to situations where the child has
suffered, or is likely to suffer, serious harm.”); id. at 52 (stating the law “should authorize
intervention only where the child is suffering or there is a substantial likelihood that the child
will imminently suffer, serious harm”); id. at 65 (permitting intervention in cases involving
“disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning, or other serious physical injury as a result
of” neglect).
348. Id. at 65.
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tiers of severity analogous to degrees of criminal offenses. Those tiers of severity
should be tied to maximum consequences.
Common fact patterns should be defined in greater detail than current
definitions of neglect—such as when actions caused by parental substance abuse
amount to neglect, or what facts coupled with parental incarceration is neglect.
These specific definitions of neglect should exclude several fact patterns that fall
into current broad neglect statutes but should not warrant state intervention.
These fact patterns include children engaged in independent activities and
parents legally using marijuana, areas that state legislatures have begun
reforming,349 and should also include inadequate housing, inadequate child care,
marijuana use (even if illegal), in utero drug exposure (without other evidence of
danger to the child), and children’s exposure to domestic violence between
adults. All of these actions by themselves do not reflect a level of parental
unfitness that would justify involuntary state intervention in families.350
Two important differences between a proposed code of child neglect and
abuse and existing criminal codes exist. First, while criminal law is appropriately
focused on an individual’s mens rea, child neglect and abuse law should remain
focused on the specific behaviors at issue and their impacts on children. A parent
who intends no harm yet struggles so much with an infant that the baby is
diagnosed with failure to thrive and is at risk of lasting developmental harms may
still be neglectful. Second, the lesser focus on mens rea is appropriate because
the purpose of the intervention differs; where the criminal justice system seeks
to punish and deter crime, the child protection system seeks to protect children
from maltreatment by their parents, support parents when possible,351 and help
rehabilitate parents when necessary so they can raise their children safely.
While fully drafting child neglect and abuse codes of comparable specificity
to criminal law is a project beyond the scope of this Article, there are several
existing sources of law that can help with the task. Criminal law already
distinguishes degrees of assault and battery based on the degree of injury caused
or attempted;352 similar degrees of harm could distinguish levels of physical
abuse. Further definitions could distinguish excessive corporal punishment from
more severe abuse which reflects a parent’s reckless inability to control their
anger rather than a disciplinary purpose.
In addition, states which have already created tiers of neglect and abuse for
purposes of their child protection registries provide a starting point for a more
detailed code.353 Such tiers can be tied to maximum types of intervention; the

349. See supra notes 306-308 and accompanying text.
350. These factors might amount to parental unfitness when other evidence is present
as well. See, e.g., supra note 95.
351. Kristen Weber’s comment to this Article outlines what such support should
entail—ensuring access to high quality and affordable health care, affordable housing, and
other community-based supports. Weber, supra note 330.
352. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600 (2021).
353. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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lowest tier of maltreatment would not generally authorize family separations, for
instance.
The left alone fact pattern in In re A.M. can illustrate how the law can
distinguish types of neglect with some specificity. Current law, as tentatively
restated by the ALI, would declare leaving a young child home alone for several
hours as neglect because it imposes a substantial risk of serious physical harm to
the child.354 But the risk of harm only addresses part of the issue. Several other
variables are relevant to determining if state intervention is needed to protect the
child and, if so, what type of intervention: the reason the child was left alone,355
the age of the child, the child’s means of seeking assistance if needed, for how
long the child was left alone, and the frequency with which a child is left alone.
A more precise delineation of child maltreatment could account for these
variables. The most severe form of leaving a child unsupervised would require
proof that the parent did so to engage in unnecessary or harmful behavior,
repeatedly, for extended periods of time, when the child could not seek assistance
if needed (due to age or otherwise). Those factors suggest a high risk of repeating
the behavior and a higher risk of harm to the child when they were left alone, and
thus a greater need for state intervention. The lowest tier would have opposite
facts—leaving the child alone to work or pursue some other necessary activity,
involving a somewhat older child, who was left alone once, for a limited time.
The facts of A.M. would be in between—but closer to—the lower tier: a parent
who left the child home alone to work, who did so once, where the child could
go to a neighbor for help, though the child appeared to be left alone for an
extended time, and was young to be left alone. Proving the more severe form
could authorize a family separation when efforts to prevent such separation
proved fruitless and no reasonable alternatives were available. Proving only the
less severe form would permit agency supervision but not authorize such a
drastic intervention.
Defining specific forms of neglect and abuse this precisely would permit
progress towards several goals. First, and most importantly, more specific
definitions of neglect aid in narrowly tailoring the state intervention in families.
Tailoring principles will be discussed regarding case plans and dispositions in
the sections that follow,356 but a prerequisite to applying such principles is the
ability to identify a specific type of neglect or abuse. Once that is done,
interventions must be tailored to that specific maltreatment, not something else.

354. The ALI offers an illustration of a parent leaving a three-year-old home alone for
four hours. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 2.24 illustration 2 (AM. L.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
355. Giovannoni and Becerra describe this as a “crucial” factor in determining what
response is appropriate. GIOVANNONI & BECERRA, supra note 70, at 246. Dorothy Roberts
relays one case in which a toddler was left alone briefly in a park when a babysitter left the
park for her car. Rather than recognizing the absence of any troublesome reason regarding the
mother’s child care arrangements, this case led to criminal citation for child neglect, a
particularly invasive investigation, and agency oversight under threat of family separation.
ROBERTS, supra note 273, at 13-21.
356. See infra Parts V.C-D, F.
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For instance, the neglect at issue in In re A.M. was relatively minor, and defining
it precisely permits the growth of statutes that would prohibit such minor neglect
from leading to family separations and terminations of parent-child relationships.
Second, and relatedly, a crucial element missing from existing child
protection law is an identification of more or less severe forms of maltreatment.
Existing categories are simply too broad to permit such categorization—physical
abuse can mean excessive corporal punishment or repeated torture, and neglect
can mean leaving a child home when child care plans fall through or causing a
failure to thrive diagnosis and risk of lasting developmental harm in an infant.
The more specifically the law identifies different types of maltreatment, the more
effectively it can place different categories of maltreatment into tiers of severity.
For some fact patterns, a focus on the extent of harm may suffice. Physical abuse
could, for instance, be defined analogously to criminal assault and battery codes,
in which the primary means to distinguish degrees of crimes is by the severity of
injury caused or threatened.357 Other categories may depend on the precise
conduct at issue; causing an infant to fail to thrive is a more severe form of
neglect than leaving an older child alone.
Third, more specific substantive definitions of neglect and abuse could
exclude some fact patterns that ought not trigger state involvement, and could do
so more surely than narrowing neglect and abuse definitions through severity of
harm alone. Consider the case of a child left alone in a park while her mother
worked because her mother lacked alternative child care.358 The harm feared by
authorities who intervened was presumably severe—assault of or accidental
harm to the child—though the likelihood of such harm was low. Specific
substantive definitions could make clear that these cases did not involve neglect
at all and, if authorities determined that they did, that they amounted to less
severe forms of maltreatment that do not permit more invasive state actions.
Relatedly, creating more specific substantive definitions facilitates further public
policy debates about which definitions are essential to maintain and which may
be repealed or otherwise not enforced—analogous to similar debates in juvenile
justice about specific provisions of the criminal code.359
B. Registry Reforms
Child neglect and abuse registries illustrate the overbroad scope of invasive
elements of the present child protection legal system and the lack of a close
connection between the type of maltreatment at issue and interventions
authorized by law. Several statutory reforms are warranted regarding placing
parents on registries, opportunities for parents to remove their names from
registries, and more precisely using registries to achieve the goal of protecting
children without unnecessarily harming families’ financial security.

357. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-600 (2021).
358. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text.
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First, CPS agencies should only have the ability to place parents on registries
when they determine the parent has neglected or abused a child and when the
substantiated neglect or abuse would pose a significant risk to people served by
positions subject to registry checks such as children at child care centers. Only
the former provision is evident in most state laws. New York state recently
adopted this principle in a reform that takes effect in 2022, requiring hearing
officers in administrative appeals of registry placements to determine if the
maltreatment is “relevant and reasonably related” to the registry’s protective
purposes.360 To tie registries more precisely to their purposes and avoid the harms
to the very population of children the child protection system exists to serve,
states should adopt similar standards.
Second, and relatedly, states should follow the lead of those which place all
forms of maltreatment into tiers,361 and limit a parent’s time on the registry based
on the tier in which the parent’s conduct falls. A parent who is responsible for a
relatively minor form of maltreatment should not face a lifetime of
consequences, even if a nexus exists between the maltreatment and the registry’s
protective purposes. Going some period of time without committing another act
of maltreatment should suffice for removal from the registry.
Third, parents should have the ability to petition to remove their names from
registries when they can show that they have remedied the conditions which led
to the substantiation. For instance, parents whose substance abuse led to neglect
who can establish they are now sober should no longer remain on the registry.
Finally, the standard of proof for placing parents on registries should be at
least preponderance of the evidence. About half of states require only probable
cause, credible evidence, reasonable evidence, or a similar formulation.362 Those
lower standards of proof not only require less evidence, but they do not generally
require CPS agencies to compare evidence that supports an allegation against
evidence that tends to exonerate a parent,363 which can lead to erroneous
placements of parents on registries. There is already a trend towards elevating
the standard of proof,364 and empirically, this difference appears to impact agency
decisionmaking. Shifting to higher standards of proof for substantiation
correlates with declines in the probability of substantiation,365 and slight declines
360. S. 7506-B, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. Part R § 1 (N.Y. 2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 424-a(e)(viii) (McKinney 2022).
361. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
362. Nicholas E. Kahn, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Standard
of Proof in the Substantiation of Child Abuse and Neglect, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333,
336-37, 362 (2017). Since that Article was published, New York changed its standard of proof
from “some credible evidence” to preponderance of the evidence. S. 7506-B, 2019-2020 Reg.
Sess. Part R § 1 (N.Y. 2020); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(5)(a) (McKinney 2022).
363. Jamison v. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
364. New York raised its standard of proof, effective Jan. 1, 2022. See supra note 362.
Previously, several other states had strengthened their standards of proof. Elizabeth Day, Laura
Tach & Brittany Mihalec-Adkins, State Child Welfare Policies and the Measurement of Child
Maltreatment in the United States, 27 CHILD MALTREATMENT (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 9), https://perma.cc/H9YU-4Z9X; Kahn et al., supra note 362, at 339, 363-64.
365. Day et al., supra note 364, at 9; Sarah Font & Kathryn Maguire-Jack, The
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in the likelihood of removal to foster care.366 A more striking empirical finding
is that higher standards of proof are associated with significant increases in CPS
agency provision of family preservation services to families, and a “reallocation
of resources within child welfare systems” to emphasize services regardless of
substantiation.367
C. Determinate Disposition Standards
1. Tying Disposition Options to Severity of Maltreatment
Child neglect and abuse law has never defined which cases of abuse or
neglect should trigger its greatest intervention—removing a child from parental
custody. Instead, any adjudication of abuse or neglect can lead to any disposition.
A judge may leave a child at home and terminate jurisdiction after adjudicating
the parent responsible for the death of a sibling, and a judge may order a child
removed after adjudicating the parent responsible for a single act of excessive
corporal punishment leaving a bruise on a child’s lower back.
Child protection and juvenile delinquency law share a history of this
indeterminacy at disposition. But just as juvenile delinquency law now features
a trend towards offense-specific maximum sentencing options,368 child neglect
and abuse law should develop limits on possible dispositions based on the
specific abuse or neglect adjudicated. This change requires a significant shift in
child neglect and abuse law—tying specific types of abuse or neglect to specific
disposition options. One of the benefits of more specific definitions of neglect
and abuse is that such definitions make such connections more achievable.
Such connections would delineate multiple categories of maltreatment
organized by severity, at least partly analogous to the various categories of crime.
The least severe set of maltreatment involves conduct that could trigger agency
oversight but should not lead to removal or, in most cases, any kind of court
oversight. If the conduct in In re A.M. amounts to neglect at all, it should fall in
this category—the issue was a lack of adequate child care, and the case could
have been resolved through a prompt return of the child to her mother along with
a provision of child care and brief agency oversight to ensure the child was not
left home alone again. Maltreatment falling in the next category, including
repeated instances of maltreatment in the least severe category, might justify
agency oversight, but with a presumption against any removal. More severe
conduct might justify removal when the state can show that particularly severe
harms have occurred or would likely occur without removal. And the most severe
(but rare) forms of maltreatment could lead to a presumption of removal.

Organizational Context of Substantiation in Child Protective Services Cases, 36 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 7414, 7424 (2021); Kahn et al., supra note 362, at 334.
366. Kahn et al., supra note 362, at 335.
367. Id. at 335, 354-55.
368. See supra Part III.E.
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Such a structure creates a more determinate system in multiple ways. Tying
specific maltreatment to maximum disposition options limits the discretion of
judges and agencies to remove children—thus moving significantly towards a
more determinate system. What matters is the specific type of maltreatment
proven to a court—not what either agency or judge believes serves children’s
interests. This focus can change the practice. Under current law, it matters
relatively little what specific maltreatment is proven—so long as any type is
proven, the judge has a full range of dispositional options. As a result, the specific
maltreatment adjudicated (through negotiation or a trial) matters relatively little.
Tying specific types of child maltreatment to maximum disposition options
creates a plea-bargaining dynamic—when the specific form of neglect or abuse
adjudicated matters more, negotiations between CPS agencies and parents
regarding what conduct can be adjudicated can be more important. It creates a
dynamic which reduces the leverage the state has over families and thus responds
to any concerns that emphasizing plea bargaining more would lead to the same
abuses of plea bargaining that occur in the criminal justice system.369 Those
abuses result from the state having tremendous leverage granted by harsh
penalties tied to certain more serious charges. But in child protection law, those
harsh penalties are currently tied to all charges—as In re A.M. shows. Any case,
no matter how minor, can lead to termination. Creating tiers of abuse or neglect
with associated disposition options can reduce state power over families. CPS
agencies will only have great leverage if they have a likelihood of proving to a
court that a parent has committed a more severe form of abuse. Absent that,
parents will have relatively strong leverage to negotiate for something no worse
than an adjudication to lower-severity categories of maltreatment.
2. Placement Preferences/Hierarchies
If the state must remove a child from parents’ custody and place the child in
the state’s custody, the law should impose meaningful placement hierarchies, not
the weak kinship placement preference in existing federal law.370 And state
statutes should do more than the status quo of listing a range of placement
options, all of which are available to courts and agencies.
The legislative agenda here is relatively simple: State legislatures should
require agencies and courts to follow a placement hierarchy whenever a child
must be removed from a parent. Other legal parents should have custody when
possible, followed by other family members or fictive kin,371 followed by
stranger foster families, followed by congregate care facilities. Whenever an
agency seeks to move down that hierarchy, the law should require it to prove
369. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 336, at 480-86.
370. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
371. “Fictive kin” refers to individuals with a close family-like relationship to a child
or the child’s parents, but who are not related biologically or through marriage or adoption.
E.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 6027.3(b) (2017). Fictive kin’s close relationship with the child
or child’s parents distinguishes living with them from living with strangers in foster care.
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why more favored options are impossible, dangerous, or otherwise strongly
contrary to a child’s best interest. The agency must bear the burden of proof for
such arguments, and courts must enforce a meaningful kinship placement
preference.372 The law should further require CPS agencies to make active efforts
to facilitate and maintain placements higher on the hierarchy; when a child’s
kinship foster parent faces eviction and thus the child faces losing a preferred
placement, agencies should have to help preserve that kinship placement, as
agencies failed to do in Ma’Khia Bryant’s case.373
D. Between Disposition and Permanency
Agency and family court discretion remains at its highest in the period from
disposition to an ultimate permanency resolution, whether that is reunification
and restoration of full custody to a parent, or adoption or guardianship with a
new permanent family. Here, the best interest standard still reigns, granting
agencies power to push to reunify or permanently separate parents and children,
and judges to order agencies to reunify families immediately or to stop working
towards reunification.
The law should significantly limit this power to reduce the risk that children
will remain in foster care unnecessarily, and reduce the possibility of disparities
in post-disposition decisions. The best tool to achieve these aims is for
legislatures to impose more meaningful substantive standards for the many
decisions made after disposition and before the end of a case. This subsection
outlines several such standards and rules.
1. Defining When Parents and Children May Reunify
Reunification should be required when a parent has substantially complied
with a case plan narrowly tailored to remedy the underlying abuse or neglect
which the court has adjudicated. Requirements beyond the specific type of
maltreatment should not be imposed; the state should not impose requirements
such as parental employment when it does not bear a direct relationship to the
underlying maltreatment.
If the agency is concerned about other forms of maltreatment, it should plead
and prove such maltreatment. If the state’s intervention is based on concern that
a parent failed to protect a child against abuse by the parent’s partner, then
mitigating the risk of subsequent abuse (such as by obtaining a protection order
372. The Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re K.W., 504 P.3d 207
(Wash. 2022), provides an example. The court made clear that agency predictions of a family
member’s likelihood of passing an agency home study, or past CPS agency involvement does
not suffice for overcoming a kinship placement preference. Id. at 221. CPS agencies and courts
must be wary of discretionary decisions with disproportionate impact on low-income families
and families of color, id. at 220, 221, and family courts must review agency denials of kinship
placements to ensure they are not based on factors which could serve as “proxies for race.” Id.
at 222.
373. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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against the abusive partner, housing independent of that partner, or some other
step) eliminates the need for further intervention, and the child should return
home immediately. If the agency is also concerned about something unrelated to
what it alleged in the petition—such as the concerns in In re A.M. about the
mother’s new relationship—then the agency should plead and prove such an
allegation.
2. Defining When to Set a Permanency Plan Other than Reunification
Existing law largely lacks a substantive standard for when to move away
from reunification as a permanency plan, and wrongly preferences adoption over
guardianship when reunification is ruled out. Family courts should only set
alternatives to reunification when, after an extended period of time,374 a parent
has not made adequate progress to remedying the conditions leading to state
intervention, and progress to permit reunification does not appear likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future. This standard sounds roughly similar to state laws
which require consideration of a parent’s compliance with a case plan and
progress “toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in
foster care.”375 Reforms suggested above—more precise definitions of grounds
justifying intervention and rules tying dispositions and case plans to address the
specific grounds in particular cases—should make existing standards for
permanency plans more determinate.
3. Establishing a Rational Hierarchy of Permanency Options
When a permanency plan change is called for, legislatures should rectify
problematic rules in existing law which preference more invasive action over
less without any empirical basis. As discussed above, existing law preferences
terminating legal relationships between parents and children and creating new
ones through adoption over options which do not require that drastic step.376
These standards lack an empirical basis and violate the principle of limiting
family integrity rights only when necessary.
At a minimum, Congress and state legislatures should repeal preferences for
terminations and adoptions over guardianship. In federal law, this means
repealing the provision requiring states to rule out adoption before considering
guardianship.377 It also means repealing the law’s push for terminations after
children have been in foster care for a certain amount of time. In addition to
revising the timeline itself, Congress should remove the push towards
terminations when states do shift away from reunification efforts.
374. What amounts to an extended period of time may reasonably be shorter for the
youngest children; children’s sense of time should be balanced with sufficient time for parents
to make progress.
375. D.C. CODE § 16-2323(b) (2022).
376. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
377. 42 U.S.C. § 673(d).
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Further steps are called for. Not only is preferencing adoption unsupported
by data, but it also runs counter to the value that ought to be placed on
maintaining children’s connections with family members. Adoption requires the
termination of children’s legal relationship with their parents. For reasons
explained below,378 terminations should be limited to situations where that legal
relationship is actively harmful to children, not simply when children cannot live
with their parents. A corollary to that rule is that adoptions should be limited to
such cases, and when children cannot reunify with their parents, the law should
preference guardianship over adoption unless any remaining legal connection
between parent and child would be harmful.
E. Defining Reasonable and Active Efforts
Just as the reasonable efforts standard has been long criticized, advocates
have also identified several means of strengthening that standard. Requiring state
agencies to make not just “reasonable” but “active efforts” to prevent removal
and reunify families is a useful start, as Alan Dettlaff and others have
advocated.379 Active efforts—which are already required when a case involves
an American Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act380—is a stronger
phrase than “reasonable efforts” and thus signals to agencies and courts that a
more meaningful standard is at play, and has been interpreted to require more.381
The federal statute does not define “active efforts,”382 but a 2016 federal
regulatory definition provides greater specificity than exists for “reasonable
efforts,” listing a range of examples of active efforts, including helping parents
overcome barriers to obtaining services, conducting searches for family members
who could support the family, and identifying available community resources.383
This definition thus represents a significant improvement upon the existing
“reasonable efforts” law.
This step, however, is only a beginning. Active efforts standards remain less
than clear in application.384 Moreover, the existing regulations repeat the central
irony of reasonable efforts law—its focus on the actions of a CPS agency, and
acceptance of the limited availability of essential supports and services from
other agencies. Active efforts can include “[i]dentifying” existing resources and
helping families access and use them.385 But if the services do not exist in the
community, courts can find active efforts. Consider a family with inadequate
378. See infra Part V.F.
379. See sources cited supra note 316.
380. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
381. E.g., In re L.M.B., 398 P.3d 207, 219 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017); see also Leonard
Edwards, Defining Active Efforts in the Indian Child Welfare Act, NAT’L ASSOC. COUNSEL FOR
CHILD.: THE GUARDIAN, Jan/Feb 2019, at 1, 3 (summarizing cases).
382. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); see also Edwards, supra note 381, at 1 (“[T]he statute did not
define the term ‘active efforts.’”).
383. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2021).
384. Edwards, supra note 381, at 1-2.
385. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2(2) (2021).
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housing; if no housing resources are available, there is no violation of the
agency’s duty to identify available resources. Agencies can still remove children
who could safely remain with their families with housing assistance.
To add meaning to the reasonable or active efforts requirement, I suggest
including several minimum principles to help define the efforts that state
agencies should take to prevent removal and reunify families.
First, a state must develop a minimally adequate set of primary prevention
and basic intervention services available to all families. This principle would
change the focus of reasonable efforts determinations from purely case-by-case
decisions—which focus on the CPS agency’s work in individual cases—and
instead focus on the systemic provision of services and supports which can help
keep children living safely with their families. Reasonable efforts findings are all
about federal financial support of state foster care systems, and the federal
government should not fund a state’s separation of families when the state fails
to provide services that can keep families together. More modest ideas have been
advocated for some time. Judge Leonard Edwards, for instance, has argued that
a CPS agency’s referral of a family to services with unreasonably long waiting
lists amounts to a failure to provide reasonable efforts.386 To implement this
principle, the federal Children’s Bureau should identify essential elements of
prevention supports and services—such as housing assistance, mental health
care, substance abuse treatment, and legal services387—and then evaluate if a
state provides a minimally adequate set of supports in each area. If, for instance,
a state fails to provide sufficient housing assistance to families, it should not then
be able to access federal financial support to separate families when sufficient
housing assistance would have alleviated the concern.
Second, CPS agencies’ efforts to prevent removal and reunify families
should include at least388 equivalent resources as would be expended if the child
were removed and placed in foster care. This principle seeks to ensure a
minimum baseline of the amount of support agencies should provide to families
and reduce financing inequities built into the foster care system.389
This first proposed principle would help respond to a common critique of
the status quo—that our child protection system confuses poverty with neglect.390
Requiring the state to offer parents the same amount of support it would offer to
foster parents would help distinguish families which can stay safely together with
adequate supports from those where true maltreatment occurs. If the family’s
challenge is primarily financial, then providing financial supports should resolve

386. Leonard Edwards, Reasonable Efforts: Let’s Raise the Bar, NAT’L ASSOC.
COUNSEL FOR CHILD.: THE GUARDIAN, Spring 2020, at 21, 22-23.
387. I do not present this as an exhaustive list.
388. This proposal states a minimum standard. The law values family integrity such that
keeping children safely with families is much preferred to removal, so the reasonable efforts
should include spending more to keep families together.
389. See supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
390. E.g., Milner & Kelly, supra note 3; Sharkkarah Harrison, ‘Poor’ Parenting—When
Poverty is Confused with Neglect, RISE (Nov. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/AZ54-UKM7.
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any threat. If something beyond poverty is the primary issue, then risks to
children will remain after providing this support. Providing that support—and
removing the excuse that it is not the CPS agency’s responsibility to provide that
support—and evaluating what happens is the most direct way to distinguish the
two categories of cases.
Third, efforts to prevent removals and reunify families must recognize that
addressing some chronic conditions—especially some substance abuse and
mental health disorders—requires concerted and evolving efforts over time. If a
parent does not successfully rehabilitate at first, CPS agency efforts must
reevaluate their approach and consider adjustments.391 As a result, agencies
referring parents once to one service provider falls short of satisfying its
obligations.392 Agencies which fail to provide the assistance parents need to visit
their children and participate in foster care fail to meet efforts requirements.393
Fourth, and relatedly, reasonable efforts must be individually tailored to the
needs of the family. When parents have a disability, CPS agencies must
accommodate that disability by modifying their efforts to prevent removal and
reunify families.394
Fifth, the reasonable efforts should orient every case decision made around
the primary goal of reunifying families. For instance, at least one state has held
that reasonable efforts includes efforts to place a child in a location conductive
to frequent contact between parents and children.395 Similarly, state CPS
agencies are already required to work to avoid changing a child’s school
enrollment when placing the child in foster care,396 though this provision is not
mentioned in the reasonable efforts statute.397 School stability avoids
exacerbating the disruption to the child’s life while helping maintain the parent’s
ability to be involved in the child’s education. A CPS agency’s failure to meet
its school stability obligations should generally indicate a failure to make
reasonable efforts to prevent removal.

391. See, e.g., In re R.J.F., 443 P.3d 387, 397 (Mont. 2019) (faulting CPS agency
because, “[w]hen Mother did not exhibit progress, the Department did nothing more to assist
Mother in meeting the goals of her treatment plan”).
392. E.g., In re James G., 943 A.2d 53, 81 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
393. E.g., In re R.J.F., 443 P.3d at 397 (“Despite Mother’s demonstrated difficulties in
travelling to Billings for visitation and services, the Department continued the very same child
placement and visitation/service arrangement.”).
394. At least one state has codified this proposition. South Carolina requires that when
a parent has a disability, reasonable efforts “must include efforts that are individualized and
based upon a parent’s or legal guardian’s specific disability, including referrals for access to
adaptive parenting equipment, referrals for instruction on adaptive parenting techniques, and
reasonable accommodations with regard to accessing services.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7720(B) (2021).
395. E.g., In re R.J.F., 443 P.3d at 398 (“[R]easonable efforts . . . do require the
Department . . . to use its best efforts to place a child in close enough proximity to a parent to
arrange visitation in sufficient frequency and duration to make it possible for a parent to
establish a bond between herself and her child.”).
396. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(G).
397. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).
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These principles are of general applicability, and do not preclude fact
pattern-specific reasonable efforts requirements,398 or arguments that are less
about services provided to families and more about whether CPS agency
judgment to remove a child is reasonable.
F. Ending Terminations of Parent-Child Relationships in All But the Most
Extreme Cases
Earlier criticisms of terminations highlighted their problematic role in
seeking to achieve permanency. As state agencies and family courts increased
their use of terminations in the name of facilitating adoptions in the 1990s, critics
established that this increased use undermined the goals of achieving
permanency, because adoptions did not keep pace with terminations, and the
result was an increasing number of legal orphans—children who had no legal
parent (due to a termination) and no new parent (because no adoption
occurred).399 Such critics recommended an important principle to limit
terminations—no termination should occur absent a need to protect children’s
welfare and a “high probability” of adoption following termination.400 Other
critics argued that terminations should only occur when the state can prove that
any ongoing relationship between parent and child would cause some “specific,
significant harm and that any alternative short of termination will not avert that
harm.”401
Some more recent advocates have gone further—advocating for the
abolition of terminations and adoptions entirely as unnecessary steps when other
permanency options such as guardianship is available.402 Indeed, the law and
398. For instance, in cases involving a parent of a young child with a substance use
disorder who needs inpatient treatment, reasonable efforts to prevent removal should include
provision of an opportunity enter a treatment program with that child. Such a requirement
follows guidance from the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which notes
that substance use disorder treatment is more effective for mothers who keep custody of their
children during treatment. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics,
Formal Op. 633, Alcohol Abuse and Other Substance Use Disorders: Ethical Issues in
Obstetric and Gynecologic Practice, 125 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1529, 1534 (2015).
399. Guggenheim, supra note 207, at 132-34.
400. Id. at 135.
401. Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 425
(1983).
402. E.g., Dettlaff et al., supra note 2, at 513 (“We also reject the concept of
‘termination of parental rights’ and support the end of this practice, leaving decisions
regarding the care and support of children to the families and communities in which they
reside.”); Albert & Mulzer, supra note 333; Ashley Albert, Tiheba Bain, Elizabeth Brico,
Bishop Marcia Dinkins & Kelis Houston, Ending the Family Death Penalty and Building A
World We Deserve, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 861, 869, 879 (2021). Others would severely
limit the practice. See, e.g., PUB. KNOWLEDGE, FAM. INTEGRITY & JUST. WORKS, CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM REPLACEMENT CHART, https://perma.cc/NY7H-4QE6 (archived Apr. 23,
2022) (calling for replacement of “[r]equirements to TPR at certain time-limited junctures”
with “[p]rohibition on TPR if parents are in treatment, only one parent is incarcerated, or
instances where a parent can continue to be a meaningful part of a child’s life”).
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practice of permanency has made clear that even when children cannot reunify
with their families of origin, they can still maintain legal and emotional bonds
with them—most prominently through guardianship.
Even when adoptions do occur, state adoption law has developed to establish
that complete terminations of the parent-child relationship are not required to
facilitate adoptions.403 In California, adoptions can occur without terminating the
parental rights of biological parents.404 In practice, contact with biological
families through the various practices and legal statuses called “open adoption”
or “adoption with contact” and trends towards more openness of adoption records
represent a sharp break from the historic secrecy of adoption.405 A growing
majority (32) of states now permit adoptive and biological parents to enter into
post-adoption contact agreements, and the vast majority of those make clear that
biological parents can enforce such agreements.406
The law and practice of terminating parent-child legal relationships has not
caught up—the legal system still orders terminations and offers legal fictions like
a new birth certificate pretending that a child was physically born to adoptive
parents,407 and agencies continue to follow the federal rule presuming
termination petitions should be filed after a child has been in foster care for
fifteen months.408 The law and practice should recognize that complete and
involuntary terminations of parental rights are required much more rarely than
current practice suggests. Quite simply, involuntary terminations are
unnecessary to obtain legal permanency and emotional stability for children
because children can have permanency without terminations.
The most justifiable use of involuntary termination of parental rights is to
protect children from further harm from their family of origin—a proposed
standard which builds on earlier calls for limiting terminations to cases when that
step is necessary to protect children.409 Complete and involuntary terminations
should only be permitted when the parent has committed an extremely severe
form of neglect or abuse—a step possible only once states define neglect and
abuse in more precise forms—or the parent’s behavior and the state of the parentchild relationship show that the harms of continuing any legal relationship

403. As Solangel Maldonado points out in her comment to this Article, open adoptions
may provide an alternative to complete and involuntary terminations in many cases. Solangel
Maldonado, Commentary, Child Protection, Evidentiary Standards and Open Adoption, 33
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022).
404. S.B. 274 § 7, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617(b) (West
2022).
405. Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2324 (2015).
406. Lisa A. Tucker, From Contract Rights to Contact Rights: Rethinking the Paradigm
for Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, 100 B.U. L. REV. 2317, 2351 (2020). Tucker catalogs
the strong trend towards enactment of statutes recognizing post-adoption contact agreements.
Id. at 2349-51.
407. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-314 (2022).
408. See supra Part II.A.5.e.
409. Garrison, supra note 401, at 425, 485-89; Guggenheim, supra note 207, at 135.
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between parent and child clearly and significantly outweighs the benefits of that
relationship.410
CONCLUSION
The child protection field features significant momentum building for
significant change. The time is thus ripe to address longstanding critiques of the
child protection legal structure—the indeterminacy of most substantive rules in
the child protection system, and the bias that indeterminacy permits throughout
child protection cases. In addition, several of the (few) determinate rules that
have developed over the years do not align with empirical evidence and the
fundamental value of protecting parents’ and children’s relationships.
Building on past critiques of the child protection legal system, this Article
demonstrates how substantive indeterminacy throughout the law can build on
itself. Vague grounds for state intervention in family life mixes with wide
discretion to determine which children to separate from parents, what to require
of parents to reunify, and whether and when to reunify—permitting
unnecessarily invasive state action.
The present moment calls for changes throughout the life of a child
protection case, establishing determinate standards which limit state
interventions to situations where they are truly necessary to protect children, and
changing determinate standards that permit more interventions than necessary.
Such changes, coupled with the growth of family defense and other changes in
the legal system, can help create a transformed child protection system that is
much better able to protect children from severe neglect and abuse while better
respecting family integrity.

410. This standard approximates the Family Integrity and Justice Work’s call to
“prohibit[]” terminations when “a parent can continue to be a meaningful part of a child’s
life.” PUB. KNOWLEDGE, FAM. INTEGRITY & JUST. WORKS, supra note 402, at 5.

